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We examine annual report text for over 15,000 non-US companies from 42 countries over 
the period 1998-2011, focusing on the length of disclosure, presence of boilerplate, 
comparability with US and non-US firms, and complexity.  We find that textual attributes are 
predictably associated with regulation and incentives for more transparent disclosure and are 
correlated with economic outcomes such as liquidity, institutional ownership, and analyst 
following.  Using mandatory IFRS adoption as an exogenous shock, annual report disclosure 
improved in the sense that quantity of disclosure increased, boilerplate was reduced, and 
comparability increased relative to both US and non-US firms.  Firms with the greatest 
improvements in financial reporting experienced the greatest improvements in economic 
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A substantial and growing literature examines and compares the characteristics of 
accounting data, particularly earnings, for firms worldwide.  However, much less is known about 
the associated textual disclosure, owing in part to the difficulty in obtaining full text annual 
reports and in part to the difficulty in quantifying textual data. 
Our goal in this paper is to provide what is, to our knowledge, the first large-sample 
empirical analysis of annual report textual disclosure for over 15,000 non-U.S. firms from 42 
countries over the period 1998-2011.  We apply textual analysis to characterize disclosure across 
a number of dimensions:  quantity of disclosure as measured by annual report length, use of 
boilerplate disclosure as measured by the use of standardized discussion, comparability as 
measured by the similarity of disclosure across firms within an industry relative to both US and 
non-US firms, and complexity of disclosure as measured by the Gunning Fog index.   
We conduct analyses to understand cross-sectional determinants of disclosure attributes 
as well as trends over time.  We also focus on one specific event, IFRS adoption, using a 
difference-in-differences design to assess the effects of an exogenous shock on disclosure.  We 
correlate disclosure attributes with economic ―outcomes‖ both in time series and cross-section, 
as well as around IFRS adoption, to assess how aspects of disclosure are associated with factors 
such as liquidity, analyst following, and institutional ownership.  We focus on a broad set of 
firms, countries, and years to provide as complete a picture as possible of the characteristics, 
trends, and economic outcomes associated with textual disclosure. 
From a descriptive perspective, we provide evidence of substantial cross-country 
variation in textual reporting.  Perhaps most striking, though, are trends over time.  The quantity 





among non-US reports as well as between non-US and US reports.  Boilerplate increased during 
the first half of the sample but has decreased in more recent years.  Fog has generally increased 
over the sample period, perhaps reflecting the increase in disclosure of more complex topics 
(e.g., financial instruments, currencies, taxes, and share-based compensation).  
In terms of determinants, and controlling for a variety of other factors, our textual 
attributes appear to be significantly influenced by regulation and the demand for information.  
Annual report disclosure is significantly longer for firms applying IFRS or US GAAP and firms 
which are audited by Big-5 auditors.  In addition, disclosure for IFRS and US GAAP firms 
contains less boilerplate and tends to be more comparable with both US and non-US firms.  The 
analysis for IFRS and US GAAP is robust to inclusion of firm and year fixed effects, suggesting 
that differences in firm-level economics or time periods do not drive the results.
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Next, we correlate our disclosure measures with liquidity, institutional ownership, and 
analyst following.  There is intuitive appeal and theoretical support for the notion that longer 
annual reports with less boilerplate and greater comparability should be correlated with greater 
transparency leading to greater liquidity, analyst following, and institutional ownership.  
However, given that our constructs are, by their very nature, imprecise and there is little existing 
literature applying them, we want to establish that they do, indeed, correlate with informational 
variables.  For parsimony, we first aggregate our textual variables using factor analysis and then 
assess whether those aggregated measures are correlated with economic outcomes.   
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 We take several steps to ensure that our comparisons are ―apples to apples.‖  First, the fact that results are robust to 
firm and year fixed effects suggests that we are not capturing country-level, firm-level or time period idiosyncrasies.  
Second, the reports are checked by the data provider to ensure basic consistency.  Third, the data analysis software 
we apply eliminates tabular and other information which appears inconsistent with English textual disclosure.  
Fourth, we also exclude reports that are US regulatory filings. Finally, we hand check a sample of cases which 





We find that liquidity, institutional ownership, and analyst following tend to be higher for 
firms with greater lagged quantities of disclosure, less boilerplate, and greater comparability with 
US firms.  While we are hesitant to draw strong conclusions on causality, results are robust to 
inclusion of firm fixed effects and lagged independent variables, as well as an instrumental 
variables analysis, suggesting that increases in our annual report variables tend to precede 
increases in liquidity, institutional ownership, and analyst following. 
Next, we investigate one particular innovation in more detail:  the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS.  IFRS adoption provides an interesting context for at least two reasons.  First, from the 
firm’s perspective, it represents a significant exogenous shock to accounting standards and 
regulation.  One of the difficulties with disclosure research in general is the fact that it suffers 
from potential endogeneity concerns.  However, mandatory IFRS adoption was largely outside of 
the firm’s control.  Second, and more importantly, while there is a substantial body of research 
examining the characteristics of accounting information around IFRS adoption, we know much 
less about its effect on textual disclosure.  Using a difference-in-differences design, we document 
striking changes in disclosure around IFRS adoption.  Relative to our control sample, IFRS 
adoption increased the ―quality‖ of annual reports in the sense that it increased the amount of 
disclosure, as well as decreasing repetitive disclosure and increasing similarity with both US and 
non-US peer firms.  Using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) analysis to examine how IFRS 
adoption affected the topics that a firm chooses to disclose in its annual report, we find that these 
overall increases in disclosure length around adoption are driven by increases in disclosure 
about, for example, financial instruments, compensation, accounting policies, and general 
financial performance. It is notable that, while empirical evidence on the impact of IFRS with 





(2013)), the effects on textual characteristics are striking, suggesting that the impact of IFRS on 
textual disclosure may have been at least as pronounced as its effect on measurement.   
Finally, we correlate changes in our measures of textual disclosure with economic 
outcomes around IFRS adoption. We first use mandatory IFRS adoption as well as peer 
disclosure variables as instruments for firm-level disclosure in an instrumental variables analysis 
to document that changes in disclosure are associated with economic outcomes. We also examine 
variation in the extent to which firms benefitted from mandatory IFRS adoption by showing that 
firms that experienced the largest increases in the quantity and comparability of disclosure also 
enjoyed greater increases in liquidity, institutional ownership, and analyst following.  Firms that 
experienced increases in fog and boilerplate showed little or no benefit of IFRS adoption.     
  Our analysis is subject to several caveats.  First, our approach and methods are somewhat 
exploratory because development of textual measures, especially in the international context, is 
still at an early stage which, in some cases, means that we develop our own metrics.  We focus 
on measures that we believe are likely to be of importance to regulators and investors globally 
(e.g., quantity of disclosure, comparability, boilerplate, and complexity).  While we take some 
comfort in the fact that our textual measures correlate with determinant and outcome variables in 
predictable ways, and change notably around IFRS adoption, we recognize that there is 
necessarily noise in our measurement.  That being said, we believe that it is important to explore 
approaches for quantifying global textual data, appropriately caveated.  
Second, we adopt a large sample approach.  There are advantages and disadvantages to a 
broad-brush approach relative to one that focuses on specific samples or selections of words.  





by a more focused analysis, it allows us to take a first step in examining textual disclosure 
choices more broadly for a wide sample of firms and relatively long time series.   
Third, we examine only English-language disclosures. While English-language disclosures 
are important given their prevalence in modern commerce, our approach excludes local language 
disclosure and firms that report only in non-English languages. There is scope for additional 
research incorporating non-English text to address international disclosure more broadly.
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In the next section, we discuss the related literature.  Then, we describe our measures, 
hypotheses, empirical design, and results.  Finally, we provide conclusions and potential 
directions for future research. 
 
II. Related Literature 
Our research is related to at least two streams of literature.  The first is the international 
research on the characteristics of accounting information.  Beginning with papers such as Alford 
et al. (1993), researchers have examined the characteristics of accounting data, particularly net 
income and shareholders’ equity, across countries.  Research such as Land and Lang (2002) 
investigates harmonization trends in accounting data over time.  More recently, several papers 
have investigated the effects of IFRS adoption on the characteristics of accounting data.  While 
some papers suggest that accounting quality has improved with IFRS adoption (e.g., Barth et al., 
2008), others provide more mixed evidence (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2013).  Although understanding 
the characteristics of accounting data is clearly important, our goal is to provide a broader 
assessment of the more complete reporting package.  Arguably, the associated textual disclosure 
is at least as important as summary accounting measurement. 
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 See Jeanjean et al. (2010) for an analysis of which firms choose to report in English and Jeanjean et al. (2014) for 
the effects of choosing to report in English.  We evaluate the sample selection effects of requiring English disclosure 





Second, our research is related to the growing body of papers applying textual analysis, 
primarily in the US.  For example, Li (2008) measures the readability of annual reports using the 
Gunning Fog index and finds that firms with poor readability have lower current and future 
performance and earnings persistence, while Miller (2010) and Lehavy et al. (2011) provide 
evidence that readability affects investors and analysts, respectively.  Other papers examine Fog 
and textual attributes such as tone for US firms (see Li 2010 for examples).   Outside of the US, 
there is little broad sample empirical evidence on textual annual report disclosure.
3
   
We are not aware of research that examines textual annual report content for large 
samples of non-US firms over significant time periods or around significant accounting changes 
such as IFRS adoption.  Given the important cross-sectional variation in institutions and 
incentives, as well as changes over time, our goal is to provide evidence on textual 
characteristics in a global setting.  In addition, we develop and validate textual disclosure 
measures such as boilerplate and comparability which we believe have the potential to contribute 
to the literature going forward. 
 
III. Primary Textual Constructs 
There are a variety of textual attributes we could consider to characterize annual report 
disclosure.  We focus on five that we believe are likely to be of interest to regulators and 
investors, and which have the potential to affect the information content of the annual report. 
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 Bischof and Daske (2013) examine sovereign risk disclosures for a sample of European banks, and Ernstberger and 
Grüning (2013) examine a single year of disclosure for a sample of European firms using artificial intelligence 
techniques. Also related, papers such as Brochet et al. (2013) study the impact of language distance on the 
complexity of conference call transcripts and Lundholm et al. (2013) examine use of numbers and textual clarity for 





a. Annual Report Length 
First, we consider the length of the disclosure, as measured by the number of words in 
textual sections of the annual report.  All else equal, we expect longer annual reports to be more 
informative.  We measure annual report length as the natural log of the total number of words 
contained in the annual report. Because we also develop a measure of boilerplate disclosure, the 
measure of length that we focus on is the length of the non-boilerplate portion of the text, 
LN_NBWORDS, but inferences are unchanged if we use the length of the entire document. 
b. Boilerplate 
Beyond the quantity of disclosure, one particular attribute that has been identified by 
regulators and standard setters as problematic is the use of ―boilerplate‖ in annual reports.  For 
example, Hans Hoogervost, chairman of the IASB, has identified boilerplate as a primary 
concern for standard setters, and notes that increasing the quantity of disclosure is not helpful if 
it simply reflects disclosure that is meant to, for example, reduce legal or reputational exposure 
rather than communicating additional information. He adds that boilerplate may even provide 
opportunities to hide information, reducing overall informativeness (Hoogervost, 2013).  The 
FASB has also identified boilerplate as a frequent concern with the content of the annual report 
(FASB, 2012).  Consistent with the view of the IASB and FASB, all else equal, we expect 
annual reports containing more boilerplate to be less informative.   
We define boilerplate as standardized disclosure that is so prevalent that it is unlikely to 
be informative.  We measure boilerplate by identifying 4-word phrases (tetragrams) that are 





which they appear in a given firm’s annual report.
4
  Our measure relies on the assumption that 
the use of extremely common phrases is a sign of boilerplate because disclosure that 
indiscriminately duplicates the disclosure of many other firms is unlikely to contain important 
firm-specific information. Our measure, BOILERPLATE, is the percent of words in the annual 
report from sentences that contain at least one of these ―boilerplate‖ phrases.
5
  See the Appendix 
for additional details on how we compute this measure, including how we exclude phrases that 
are likely to be part of mandatory regulatory disclosure. 
c. Comparability 
Standard setters, regulators, and other stakeholders have long argued that comparability 
across, for example, firms within an industry is an important attribute for users of financial 
statement information.  The IASB and FASB concept statements identify comparability as one of 
four characteristics that enhance the usefulness of information that is relevant and faithfully 
represented, and one of the primary goals of the IASB has been to improve the comparability of 
accounting information globally. 
True comparability is difficult to measure because it goes beyond similarity or 
uniformity.
6
  In particular, it is difficult to disentangle whether similarity is ―making unlike 
things look alike.‖  We focus on the similarity of textual information because it is easier to 
operationalize and attempt to compare ―like‖ things by comparing disclosure within industry 
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 Barrett et al. (2006) discuss why the distributional properties of word phrases make it very unlikely that different 
authors would use identical phrases, even when discussing similar topics, and researchers have exploited this fact to 
identify duplication such as plagiarism. 
5
 Because our boilerplate measure is calculated as a percent of total word count, it may be affected by document 
length, where the same number of repeated phrases makes up a smaller proportion of a longer document. To control 
for mechanical effects, we include powers of total word count as control variables in BOILERPLATE regressions, 
similar to Brown and Tucker (2011).  In addition, sentences containing boilerplate could contain useful numerical 
information which makes them informative.  Inferences are unchanged if we identify informative numbers using the 
approach in Blankespoor (2014) and exclude boilerplate sentences that include these numbers.  
6
 In Concepts Statement No. 8, the FASB clarifies that, ―Comparability is not uniformity. For information to be 
comparable, like things must look alike and different things must look different. Comparability of financial 
information is not enhanced by making unlike things look alike any more than it is enhanced by making like things 





groupings, recognizing that this approach is subject to caveats.  We focus on two comparison 
groups, non-US firms and US firms, because a primary goal of the IASB has been to increase 
comparability in reporting among non-US firms, and one of the goals of the convergence effort 
between the IASB and FASB has been to increase comparability between US and non-US firms.  
These two splits are also of interest because they permit us to assess whether it matters with 
whom a firm is similar.   
 Both of our measures of comparability are estimated by comparing how similar the words 
a firm uses in its annual report are with those used by its non-US and US peers. We compare 
reports using cosine similarity, a textual measure which identifies similar documents by 
comparing the relative word frequencies across documents.  It is bounded between 0 and 1, 
where documents with identical proportions of words have a score of 1, and those with no 
overlapping words have a score of 0. Several recent studies in accounting and finance have used 
variants of this measure. For example, Brown and Tucker (2011) examine year-to-year changes 
in MD&A, Peterson et al. (2012) measure the similarity in firms’ descriptions of accounting 
practices, and Hoberg and Phillips (2010) compare product descriptions in 10-K filings. 
We compute the comparability of each firm as the median of its cosine similarity with all 
of its current peer firms, where non-US peers are used to calculate XUS_COMP and US peers 
are used to calculate US_COMP. Because we are interested in capturing comparability (i.e., 
similar underlying economics being reported similarly), we match our sample firms to non-US 
and US peers in the same 3-digit ICB (Industrial Classification Benchmark) industry and fiscal 
year, and choose the 30 firms with the closest matches of lagged total assets. Additional details 







Our final measure is Fog.  Papers such as Li (2008) use the Gunning Fog Index to 
measure the readability of text based on the length of sentences and the proportion of complex 
terminology.  We include Fog because it has been the focus of much of the research on textual 
attributes in the US.  However, interpretation is clouded in our context by the fact that Fog likely 
combines the complexity of the underlying economics with the complexity of disclosure.  For 
example, an increase in the disclosure of financial instruments and hedging will, of necessity, 
likely increase the complexity of disclosure.  Nevertheless, we view Fog as a potentially 
important construct given the prior literature.   Fog is defined as: 
Fog = (words_per_sentence + percent_complex_words) * 0.4 





Given the lack of prior research on textual attributes, especially in international contexts, our 
investigation is to some extent descriptive.  However, we develop our analyses around general 
hypotheses linking our textual measures to determinants and outcomes.   
In our first set of analyses, we investigate the link between our textual attributes and 
factors such as accounting standards (US GAAP and IFRS), auditor quality (large vs. small 
auditors), and exchange listings (ADR’s on US markets).  For parsimony, we refer to IFRS and 
US GAAP as ―non-local accounting standards‖ and auditor quality and ADR listing as 
―oversight,‖ although we acknowledge that these variables have broader effects.   
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 The Fog index can be interpreted as the number of years of education an average person would need to understand 
a given piece of writing.  For example, the children’s book ―The Cat in the Hat‖ has a Fog index of 3 whereas the 
Declaration of Independence has a Fog index of 20.  See Bushee et al. (2014) for a discussion of the difficulty in 





 Hypothesis 1:  Non-local accounting standards and greater oversight  
a. increase the quantity of textual disclosure,  
b:  increase the comparability of disclosure among non-US firms,  
c:  increase the comparability of disclosure with US firms,   
d: decrease boilerplate, and  
 f: affect the level of Fog. 
We predict that the quantity of disclosure will be higher for firms with non-local 
accounting standards based on the notion that US GAAP and IFRS impose (relative to local 
GAAP) more detailed disclosure requirements. We also predict that higher quality auditors and 
SEC oversight result in firms complying more fully with required disclosure.   
We predict that adoption of non-local accounting standards, as well as large auditors and 
SEC oversight, will increase the comparability of reporting among non-US firms as they promote 
more standardized disclosure.  However, because our comparison firms include both local GAAP 
and non-local GAAP firms, the extent to which nonlocal standards increase comparability 
overall is an empirical question.
8
 
We expect US GAAP and US listing to increase the comparability between non-US firms 
and US firms because of shared accounting standards and regulatory requirements.  IFRS will 
increase the comparability between non-US firms and US firms to the extent that IFRS has 
converged towards US standards.
9
  Similarly, if large auditors enhance the consistency of 
reporting (and given the fact that the Big-5 originated in the US), we expect greater 
comparability with US firms for firms employing large auditors.   
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 We also examine comparability among IFRS firms only and demonstrate that, as expected, IFRS adoption has 
stronger comparability-increasing effects among IFRS firms than between IFRS firms and local GAAP firms. 
9
 We also predict, and find evidence, that US GAAP has more of an effect on comparability with US firms, while 





Given the focus of the FASB, SEC, and IASB on reducing boilerplate, we expect 
adoption of IFRS or US GAAP, or listing on US exchanges, to reduce boilerplate.  Similarly, to 
the extent that large auditors focus on the quality of disclosure, we expect lower levels of 
boilerplate.  However, it is an open question as to whether boilerplate has actually been reduced 
in practice.  
 Our hypothesis with respect to Fog is non-directional because it can be driven by both 
beneficial and detrimental aspects of disclosure.  Prior research provides evidence that Fog may 
be linked to managerial obfuscation (Li 2008) and higher processing costs (Miller 2010), but it is 
affected by multisyllabic words which can be associated with informative technical disclosure.  
If nonlocal accounting standards and oversight simplify language, we expect them to reduce Fog.  
However, they may necessitate increased discussion of technical topics, increasing Fog. 
 Hypothesis 2:  Increased quantity and comparability of disclosure are associated with 
greater liquidity, analyst following, and institutional ownership. 
For parsimony in our outcomes investigation, we begin by conducting a factor analysis of 
textual attributes.  The first factor is positively associated with the quantity of disclosure and 
comparability of disclosure with both non-US and US firms.  We predict that this factor will be 
positively associated with liquidity, analyst following, and institutional ownership for two 
reasons.  First, more disclosure, all else equal, should increase informativeness and decrease 
information asymmetry among investors.
10
  Second, Defranco et al. (2011) argue that 
comparability enhances the ability of investors and other financial statement users to understand 
and predict economic events by decreasing information acquisition and processing costs and by 
providing information about shared economic factors. 
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 Prior research suggests that liquidity (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), analyst following (Lang and Lundholm 





Hypothesis 3:  Increased fog and boilerplate are associated with reduced liquidity, 
analyst following, and institutional ownership. 
 Our second factor is positively associated with boilerplate and Fog, and we expect it to be 
negatively correlated with liquidity, analyst following, and institutional ownership.  Conditional 
on the quantity of disclosure, we expect lower information content in disclosure that is 
characterized by high levels of boilerplate (Hoogervost (2013)) and low levels of readability (Li 
(2008)). We also expect both boilerplate and low readability to increase the difficulty for 
financial statement users to extract the available information from the financial statements, 
increasing their information acquisition costs. 
 Our last hypothesis examines textual characteristics in the context of IFRS adoption and 
is presented in two parts: 
Hypothesis 4.a:   Mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with increases in the quantity 
of textual disclosure, increases in comparability among non-US firms and with US firms, 
reductions in boilerplate, and changes in Fog.  
This hypothesis follows from the discussion of IFRS in Hypothesis 1.  While the specific 
financial reporting effects associated with IFRS adoption likely varied based on firms’ particular 
circumstances, the effect on the typical firm was substantial.
11
 Although firms faced disclosure 
requirements in the local environment, we expect that mandatory adoption of IFRS increased the 
quantity of disclosure required in most jurisdictions.   
In addition, the fact that IFRS provided a shared set of guidance relative to local GAAP 
likely increased the comparability of reporting among non-US firms (particularly those that 
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  For example, IFRS requires substantive disclosure regarding financial instruments (IFRS 7), employee benefits 
and pensions (IAS19), share-based payments (IFRS 2), operating segments (IFRS 3), income taxes (IAS 12), 
provisions and contingencies (IAS 37), property, plant and equipment (IAS 16), intangible assets (IAS 38), foreign 





adopted IFRS) and with US firms due to convergence between the two sets of standards.  We 
also expect a reduction in boilerplate given the fact that IFRS was designed to provide 
substantive disclosure, and many firms were coming from environments in which disclosure had 
traditionally been influenced by statutory requirements.  We do not have strong predictions for 
Fog because, while IFRS might have provided clearer disclosure relative to local requirements, it 
also likely increased disclosure of technical topics.   
Hypothesis 4.b:  Firms with the largest increases in desirable disclosure attributes 
around mandatory IFRS adoption (increases in the quantity and comparability of disclosure) 
experienced greater increases in liquidity, analyst following, and institutional investment, while 
those with the largest increases in undesirable disclosure attributes (increases in boilerplate and 
Fog) experienced smaller benefits of IFRS adoption. 
This prediction follows from hypotheses 2 and 3 and is related to prior studies examining 
variation in benefits from IFRS adoption.  If the associations we document in the overall sample 
reflect the effect of accounting standards and oversight, we expect the effects of IFRS on 
liquidity, analyst following, and institutional investment to be most pronounced in contexts in 
which mandatory adoption was associated with the greatest increases in the quantity and 




V.  Sample Selection 
We gathered annual reports from the Global Reports database in Bureau van Dijk’s 
Osiris, which contains annual reports for public companies in more than 100 countries beginning 
in the 1990s. We restrict the sample to the 42 countries that had at least 1,000 annual reports as 
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 The notion that the benefits of IFRS adoption vary cross-sectionally is consistent with research such as Daske et al 







  Osiris acquires annual reports directly from the company or through the 
company’s website.  Of the resulting 194,973 English reports, we retained 87,608 unique reports 
which had the appropriate accounting data and passed our data screens.
14
 
Table 1 presents descriptive data by country and year.  Observations are spread across a 
wide range of countries including emerging market economies.  The largest number of 
observations comes from the UK which comprises approximately 15% of the sample.  The 
number of observations increases over time based on availability of electronic annual reports, 
with the largest number in 2009, but there are a substantial number of observations throughout 
the 2000’s.  We include firm and year fixed effects in our primary analyses so results should not 
be unduly influenced by changes in sample composition over time. 
Table 2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the primary variables in the paper.  
The median firm is fairly large, with total market capitalization of $114.5 million, but the 
interquartile range extends from $24.7 to $588.9 million.  About a third of the observations are 
reported under IFRS, and 2% apply US GAAP or trade on US exchanges.  About half of the 
firms are audited by Big-5 affiliated auditors. The textual component of the average annual 
report has about 17,000 words, and the interquartile range is from 11,000 to 26,000 words. 
 Table 2, Panels B and C provide descriptive statistics comparing our sample to the 
Datastream population overall and split by English and non-English speaking countries. Our 
sample includes about a third of the Datastream population, but is more representative of firms 
with analyst data and firms in English-speaking countries, suggesting that Osiris was more likely 
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 Our data end in fiscal 2011 because Osiris no longer provides academic access to full text financial reports.  We 
did not include reports for companies listed under the Cayman Islands because most of these companies are 
domiciled in other countries.  
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to include firms followed by analysts and firms in English-speaking countries.  In our analyses, 
we discuss results comparing English and non-English countries.   
Table 2, Panel D reports descriptive statistics for our textual measures over time.
15
  
Despite the fact that the average size of the sample firms has decreased over time due to 
increases in the breadth of the sample, the number of words in the typical annual report has 
increased.  In general, Fog has increased over time, perhaps reflecting increased disclosure of 
complex topics.  Boilerplate increased during the pre-IFRS period, but has decreased since 2004.  
Perhaps most interesting, reporting has become consistently more similar over time, both relative 
to the US as well as relative to other non-US firms.  The increase in similarity has been more 
pronounced among non-US firms, likely reflecting the effects of IFRS in converging accounting 
practice explored in later analyses.  Especially following 2005, the similarity among non-US 
firms increased relative to the similarity with US firms, again likely reflecting the effect of IFRS. 
Table 2, Panel E presents descriptive statistics on textual attributes by country, after 
controlling for size and year.  While we do not perform formal statistical analyses, Asian 
countries, especially China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Indonesia, tend to have higher Fog and 
Boilerplate scores.  In contrast, Fog and Boilerplate tend to be lower in European countries, 
especially the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 
Results by industry (not tabulated) suggest that, controlling for other factors, disclosure 
tends to be particularly lengthy for banks and insurance companies but shorter for industrial 
companies such as automobile manufacturers and chemicals.  Interestingly, bank and insurance 
disclosure also tends to be more comparable, both among non-US firms as well as with US firms, 
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 To ensure that the patterns in Table 2, Panel D do not reflect changes in sample composition over time, we also 
investigated trends after controlling for a wide array of fundamentals such as size, year, industry, profitability, 
leverage, and Big-5 auditor.  Inferences are robust to inclusion of controls, suggesting that changes in sample 





perhaps reflecting additional oversight in the banking sector and the idiosyncratic nature of 
banking relative to other industries.  Fog tends to be high in insurance, telecommunications, and 
healthcare, likely reflecting the prevalence of technical language in those industries.   
 
VI. Correlations 
Table 3 presents correlations.  Several sets of comparisons are relevant.  First, the 
correlations among the various textual attribute measures are not particularly high, with most 
correlations below about 30%.  The exception is the correlation between US similarity and non-
US similarity (52%), indicating that annual reports that are more similar to non-US peer firms 
also tend to be more similar to US peers.  The other correlations are generally consistent with 
intuition.  Fog tends to be positively correlated with percent boilerplate (21%), while percent 
boilerplate is negatively correlated with non-boilerplate annual report length (-11%).  
Second, the correlations between the textual variables and our primary variables of 
interest give a sense for the results to follow, albeit without controls.  IFRS is positively 
correlated with similarity among non-US firms (36%) and with US firms (15%), consistent with 
the goal of the IASB to increase comparability of reporting among non-US firms and to converge 
with US GAAP.   IFRS, US GAAP, Big-5 Auditor, and ADR have correlations with our textual 
characteristics consistent with the hypothesis that they lead to higher reporting quality in terms of 
longer disclosure, less boilerplate, and greater comparability with non-US and US firms.  
Finally, the correlations provide preliminary evidence on the relation between the textual 
variables and various market outcomes generally consistent with our expectations.  Liquidity, 





are longer, contain less boilerplate and Fog, and which are more comparable to US firms.
16
  
These correlations are reassuring because they suggest that market outcomes are correlated with 
our text-based measures in predictable ways.  While these correlations do not control for other 
factors, regression results going forward which include numerous controls, as well as firm and 




VII. Regression Results 
Table 4 provides our first set of regression results examining determinants of the textual 
characteristics.  We first present results of a mixed model with random firm effects and fixed 
year effects in Panel A.  While we include firm and year fixed effects in our remaining analyses, 
applying random firm effects in Panel A permits us to investigate the impact of variables which 
exhibit very little within-firm variation over our sample period, such as Big-5 auditor and ADR. 
In Panel B, we include firm fixed effects so that our analyses going forward are 
essentially within-firm comparisons.  Regression results are generally consistent with the 
correlations in Table 3, indicating that conclusions are robust to less restrictive specifications 
permitting cross-firm variation.
18
  We include year fixed effects to abstract from trends in textual 
attributes over time as well as from changes in general macroeconomic conditions. Standard 
errors throughout are clustered by firm.  
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 We also considered the measure of liquidity based on price pressure from Amihud (2002): absolute value of 
returns divided by volume.  That measure is highly correlated with zero return days and bid/ask spreads, and yields 
similar significant correlations with our primary variables of interest. 
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 In addition, we lose observations due to requirements related to control variables in the regression specifications.  
The fact that the regression results are consistent with the correlations suggests that regression results are likely to be 
representative of the broader sample. 
18
 Results are robust to other approaches such as industry and country fixed effects.  We also estimated our 
regressions including controls for earnings quality based on Wysocki (2008).  We exclude them from our reported 





 Because our initial goal is to understand the determinants of the textual attributes, 
particularly those related to aspects of oversight, regulatory environment, and incentives, we 
control for a wide range of potential economic determinants.  Annual report length is positively 
associated with firm size, book/market ratio, and earnings surprise.  The notion that larger firms 
would have more to disclose is not surprising.  If book/market reflects firm maturity and 
stability, greater disclosure is likely driven by greater underlying complexity. Large earnings 
surprises also likely necessitate greater disclosure.  Boilerplate tends to be lower for firms that 
are larger and those reporting losses, suggesting that greater uncertainty necessitates less generic 
disclosure.  Fog is higher for smaller firms and for firms that are less profitable or reporting 
losses, consistent with Li (2008).  
In terms of the primary relations of interest, IFRS is strongly associated with each of our 
individual textual measures in both specifications.  IFRS annual reports tend to be significantly 
longer than non-IFRS annual reports, consistent with Hypothesis 1.a and with IFRS increasing 
overall disclosure requirements.  IFRS reports exhibit greater similarity with other non-US 
annual reports, consistent with Hypothesis 1.b.  Existing research provides mixed evidence on 
the extent to which IFRS reporting increases comparability of accounting amounts such as net 
income among firms (e.g., Yip and Young 2012 and Cascino and Gassen 2012).  However, our 
results suggest that the effects of IFRS on textual comparability are quite strong.  In addition, 
IFRS reports exhibit greater similarity with US annual reports, consistent with Hypothesis 1.c 
and with the evidence in Barth et al. (2012) that IFRS increased measurement comparability with 
US firms, and suggesting that the efforts toward convergence were manifested not only in 
measurement but in textual disclosure as well.  Boilerplate is significantly lower for IFRS firms, 





1.d.  Overall, the effect of IFRS on textual reporting on the whole appears to be ―good‖ in the 
sense that it is associated with more disclosure, less boilerplate, and greater similarity with both 
US and non-US firms.  
US GAAP generally has similar effects as IFRS in the sense that it is associated with 
more textual disclosure, less boilerplate, and greater similarity with both US firms and non-US 
firm, consistent with Hypotheses 1 a-d.  As expected, the effect of US GAAP is stronger for 
comparability relative to US firms than comparability relative to non-US firms while IFRS is 
more strongly associated with comparability relative to non-US firms.   
The presence of a Big-5 auditor and a listed ADR also appear to improve textual 
reporting.  Firms with Big-5 auditors provide more extensive disclosure with less boilerplate and 
greater similarity with non-US firms, consistent with Hypotheses 1 a-c.  Cross listing 
significantly increases the length of the annual report and increases similarity of reporting with 
both US and non-US firms, consistent with Hypotheses 1 a-d, although it is not significantly 
correlated with boilerplate. Results in Panel B with firm fixed effects are consistent with those in 
Panel A for IFRS and US GAAP, but are weaker with respect to ADR and Big-5 auditor because 
of their limited variability in the dataset.  
The one characteristic that is mixed is Fog.  Fog is positively related to IFRS and ADR.  
The coefficients on US GAAP and Big-5 auditor are positive but insignificant.  While we do not 
have a directional prediction for Fog, it appears that Fog is higher under nonlocal accounting 
standards and greater oversight, perhaps reflecting greater disclosure of complex topics.
19
 
Because the various text attributes are not independent and for parsimony going forward, 
we combine the textual analysis variables into factors using exploratory factor analysis.  Results 
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 These and all other regressions are robust to additional controls for percent of closely held shares and the number 





of the factor analysis are reported in Table 5.  There appear to be two primary factors in the 
textual variables.  Factor 1 is strongly influenced by the quantity and comparability of disclosure.  
It is higher for annual reports that are longer and are characterized by greater similarity with both 
US and non-US firms.  If we expect longer annual reports that are more comparable to be more 
informative, we would expect Factor 1 to be ―good‖ in the sense that it is associated with more 
informative reporting.  Factor 2, which is weaker, is higher for annual reports with more 
boilerplate and Fog, suggesting that it captures less informative reporting.
20
 
Table 4 also reports regression results including these two factors.  Consistent with the 
results from the previous analysis, Factor 1 tends to be larger for firms following IFRS or US 
GAAP and for firms listing on US exchanges or employing Big-5 auditors.  Results for Factor 2 
are weaker, but largely consistent with the expectation that IFRS and US GAAP improve the 
quality of reporting.  The incremental effect of ADR in Panel B is positive (although only 
marginally significant) perhaps reflecting the increased regulatory disclosure requirements 
associated with cross listing. 
 
VIII. Economic Consequences 
Determinants of textual attributes are potentially of innate interest because regulators and 
standard setters have discussed the importance of constructs such as comparability, boilerplate, 
and quantity of disclosure.  However it is also important to assess the association between textual 
attributes and potential economic outcomes one would expect to be correlated with improved 
information content.  This is particularly an issue in this context because there is little extant 
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 Comparability with non-US firms and Fog affect both factors, although non-US comparability is more strongly 
associated with Factor 1 while Fog is more strongly associated Factor 2.  The presence of Fog and comparability 





research linking these types of textual variables to potential information-based outcomes and 
several of our textual variables have not been used previously in the literature. 
 We investigate three types of outcomes: liquidity, analyst following, and institutional 
ownership.  We use two measures of liquidity, zero return days and bid-ask spreads.  Zero return 
days is the percent of days during the year on which the stock price did not change and is 
predicated on the notion that days with zero returns are likely days on which no significant 
trading occurred.  While it runs the risk of misclassifying some days, it provides the largest 
potential sample because it does not require bid-ask spreads or volume data and is less sensitive 
to measurement variation.  Bid-ask spread is the difference between the bid and ask price divided 
by the average of the two. It captures the explicit transactions cost of trading but is available for 
a smaller proportion of firms and may not be measured consistently across exchanges.  Analyst 
following reflects the number of IBES analysts providing earnings forecasts.  Institutional 
ownership is measured using institutional holdings data from the Thomson Reuter’s International 
Mutual Fund (TIMF) database and captures the percent of shares held by mutual funds. 
Results are presented in Table 6 for the two primary factors and we discuss results for the 
components in the text.  Coefficient estimates for the control variables are largely consistent with 
expectations.  In particular, liquidity, institutional ownership, and analyst following are higher 
for large firms, firms with positive profits, and firms with higher book/market ratios. 
In terms of our primary relations of interest, results are consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 
3, and with the correlations in Table 3.  Factor 1, which captures the quantity and comparability 
of disclosure, is significantly negatively correlated with zero return days and positively 
correlated with analyst following and institutional ownership, consistent with Hypothesis 2.  In 





annual report and similarity with US firms. Factor 2 is positively correlated with both illiquidity 
measures and negatively correlated with analyst following and mutual fund ownership, 
consistent with Hypothesis 3.  The results for the second factor are driven primarily by 
boilerplate, as well as Fog. 
Overall, the results suggest that our textual attributes are correlated with economic 
outcomes in predictable ways. We are hesitant to draw causal inference given the difficulty in 
assessing whether it was the annual report disclosure per se that caused the information effects.  
Nevertheless, the results suggest that, as expected, the quantity of disclosure and similarity with 
US reporting are associated with improved information environments, while boilerplate and Fog 
are associated with less information. 
 
IX. Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Disclosure Attributes 
The preceding analyses suggest a general relation between textual attributes, firm 
characteristics, and economic outcomes.  As noted in our discussion of Hypothesis 4.a, it is also 
informative to focus specifically on changes around mandatory IFRS adoption for at least two 
reasons.  First, wide-spread adoption of IFRS represents one of the most significant innovations 
in the history of accounting and little is known about changes in associated textual disclosure.  
Second, because mandatory IFRS adoption was largely exogenous from the firm’s perspective, 
examining changes in reporting around IFRS adoption allows us to better identify disclosure 
effects associated with IFRS and validate our textual measures. 
In Table 7, we estimate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on disclosure using a 





group and non-adopting firms our control group.
21
  Because the regression includes both firms 
that switched to IFRS as well as those that did not, we are able to measure changes in reporting 
for IFRS adopters controlling for changes which occurred for non-adopting firms.  Results for 
the control variables are generally consistent with those in Table 4.    
Our primary variable of interest is the interaction between the indicator for the post-
adoption period and the indicator for mandatory IFRS adopters, POST x MANDATORY, which 
captures the difference in disclosure between firms affected by mandatory IFRS adoption relative 
to the control sample.  Because they are collinear with the firm and year fixed effects, POST and 
MANDATORY are omitted from the regression.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 4.a, IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in the 
length of annual reports relative to the control sample, likely reflecting the increased disclosure 
associated with IFRS adoption.  In addition, IFRS adoption is associated with a lower percentage 
of boilerplate relative to the control sample.   
The coefficient on POST x MANDATORY in the XUS_COMP regression in column 3 is 
significantly positive, suggesting that IFRS adoption is associated with increased comparability 
of textual disclosure across non-US firms.  To examine the comparability effect in more detail, 
column 4 reports results for comparability among IFRS-adoption groups (i.e., adopters are 
compared only with adopters and non-adopters are compared with non-adopters).  While we 
expect IFRS to increase comparability in general, the result should be particularly pronounced 
relative to IFRS firms.  Comparing column 3 with column 4, the effect of IFRS on comparability 
was substantially stronger among IFRS firms (IFRS_COMP) than among all non-US firms in 
general (XUS_COMP).  While prior findings on accounting comparability around IFRS adoption 
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are mixed, our results suggest that the effects on textual comparability were quite pronounced, 
particularly among IFRS firms. 
IFRS adoption is also associated with improved comparability with US firms 
(US_COMP).  The results for textual comparability are consistent with the findings in prior 
literature that IFRS increased comparability in the measurement of net income and shareholders’ 
equity between IFRS and US firms. The relation between IFRS adoption and Fog is insignificant. 
In terms of the two factors, IFRS adoption is associated with a significant increase in Factor 1, 
driven primarily by the increase in length and comparability around IFRS adoption.  Factor 2 is 
significantly negative, reflecting primarily the decrease in boilerplate associated with IFRS 
adoption. 
 Overall, the results from the IFRS analysis suggest striking changes in textual 
characteristics around IFRS adoption, consistent with Hypothesis 4.a. While it is dangerous to 
draw strong conclusions, it seems plausible based on our results that the effects of IFRS on 
textual disclosure were at least as important as the effects on accounting measurement.  Further, 
the IFRS results help to mitigate concerns about endogeneity and omitted correlated variables. 
 In addition, we conducted untabulated analyses splitting the sample and find systematic 
differences in the effects of IFRS across various country- and firm-level partitions.  Previous 
research suggests that differences in reporting philosophies and regulation, in particular code 
versus common law, affect accounting practice.  The direction of the effect is difficult to predict 
because the philosophy underpinning IFRS is arguably more consistent with common law 
reporting and enforcement of IFRS adoption is likely stronger in common law countries.  On the 
other hand, local GAAP in code law countries is arguably less similar to IFRS, causing these 





may apply IFRS more conscientiously, increasing the effects of IFRS, but they may also have 
had higher quality reporting prior to IFRS adoption.  To the extent that non-English language 
countries translated their annual reports to English (as opposed to authoring the originals in 
English), IFRS adoption may have affected the English reports and translation process for firms 
in non-English countries differently relative to reports that originated in English. 
 In general, the effects of IFRS adoption appear to have improved Factor 1 components 
more for code law countries and non-English countries, consistent with the notion that these 
countries likely provided less, and more idiosyncratic, disclosure prior to IFRS adoption.  In 
terms of Factor 2, common law and English language countries experienced the greatest 
improvements, primarily driven by reductions in boilerplate.  Overall Big-5 auditors were 
associated with greater improvements in Factor 1, suggesting that better oversight was associated 
with greater improvements in positive disclosure attributes around IFRS adoption. 
 
X. Changes in Annual Report Topics around IFRS Adoption 
 To provide further insight into what specific aspects of reporting changed most around 
IFRS adoption, we use a textual methodology developed in the natural language processing 
literature called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA).  As discussed in more detail in the Appendix, 
LDA uses the probability of words co-occurring within documents to identify sets of topics and 
their associated words. It can be thought of as the textual equivalent of factor analysis, where the 
model produces topics instead of factors.
 
  
We examine which topics experienced large increases in prominence after IFRS adoption 
by estimating the effect of IFRS adoption on the relative proportion of topics in firm annual 





fixed effects for each topic, where the topic loading is the dependent variable and the main 
independent variable of interest is the POST x MANDATORY interaction. The coefficient on 
this variable can be interpreted as the effect of IFRS adoption on the extent to which firms 
discussed a particular topic in their annual reports. We control for length to ensure that topic 
loadings were not altered as a mechanical function of changes in document length.
22
  We expect 
topics related to standards which required substantial additional disclosure under IFRS relative to 
local GAAP to show the greatest increases in length after adoption. For example, required 
disclosures on financial instruments and derivatives (IFRS 7), employee compensation (IAS19 
and IFRS2), and more detailed operating information (IFRS 3), among others, are particularly 
extensive under IFRS and thus would potentially show substantial increases after adoption. 
Table 8 reports the coefficients and t-statistics for the POST x MANDATORY variable 
for those topics which showed the largest increases around IFRS adoption, as well as the twenty 
most prominent words within each topic. After IFRS adoption, firms appeared to substantially 
increase the amount of disclosure dedicated to financial instruments and derivatives (Topic 2), 
executive compensation (Topics 5 and 6), and employee stock options (Topic 1). Some of the 
keywords for the topics are more difficult to interpret, but reading reports for occurrence of the 
key terms suggests that Topic 3 relates to the description of a firm’s accounting policies, while 
the other topics appear to cover financial performance of, for example, subsidiaries (Topic 9) and 
investments (Topic 8). While the results are descriptive, they suggest that the increases in 
disclosure length around mandatory IFRS adoption appear to be associated with specific 
disclosures that one might expect to increase under IFRS. 
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XI. Instrumental Variables Analysis of Economic Outcomes 
 Our discussion of the effects of our textual characteristics on market outcomes in Table 6 
was caveated by the fact that the results could be influenced by correlated omitted variables. In 
this section, we utilize mandatory IFRS adoption and attributes of peer firms in an instrumental 
variables analysis to more robustly examine the relation between firm disclosure and liquidity, 
analyst following, and institutional ownership.
23
 
 In order to perform the instrumental variables (IV) analysis, we need to identify at least 
as many exogenous instruments as endogenous regressors.  A good instrument exhibits a high 
correlation with the endogenous variable to instrument but is uncorrelated with the error term. 
Factors 1 and 2 in Table 6 are both potentially endogenous, so we need at least two instruments 
in order to identify the IV specification. Table 4 indicates that various other attributes such as 
auditor and ADR listing are associated with textual characteristics, but these variables also 
reflect firm choices. However, mandatory IFRS adoption was relatively exogenous at the firm 
level. Additionally, firm-level disclosure is likely to be correlated with the disclosure of industry 
peers because of similarities in industry accounting and disclosure requirements, but peer 
disclosure is also largely exogenous from the perspective of the firm. We therefore use 
mandatory IFRS adoption and the attributes of peer firms in the same country-industry-year as 
instrumental variables to identify the outcomes associated with disclosure. 
 Table 9 Panel A reports results of regressions of FACTOR1 and FACTOR2 on our 
instruments, where IFRS is an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm has mandatorily adopted 
IFRS, and MEAN_PEER_FACTOR1 and MEAN_PEER_FACTOR2 are the mean levels of 
FACTOR1 and FACTOR2 for all other firms in the same country-industry-year. 
MEAN_PEER_ADR and MEAN_PEER_BIG5 are the percent of a firm’s industry peers that 
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have an ADR or Big 5 auditor, respectively.
24
  The results in the table indicate that IFRS, 
MEAN_PEER_FACTOR1, and MEAN_PEER_FACTOR2 have predictable, statistically 
significant effects on FACTOR1 and FACTOR2. The other two instruments do not appear to be 
particularly strong. Overall, our instruments for FACTOR1 and FACTOR2 are powerful enough 
to be able to predict textual characteristics, as indicated by the significant F-statistics.
25
 
 Table 9 Panel B reports the results of our IV analysis using the instruments in Table 9 
Panel A for FACTOR1 and FACTOR2. The results are very similar to Table 6 and indicate that 
textual firm disclosure has a significant association with liquidity, analyst following, and 
institutional ownership.
26
 A drawback to using mandatory IFRS adoption as an instrument for 
firm-level disclosure is that doing so excludes firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS. Also, we 
document in Table 10 that IFRS has a direct effect on economic outcomes which means that 
omitting it in the second stage can introduce omitted variables bias. Therefore, in Table 9 Panel 
C we estimate an instrumental variables specification using only peer variables as instruments. 
Consistent with Table 6, we again find significant associations between textual disclosure and 
liquidity, analyst following, and institutional ownership.
27
  Subject to the caveat that this 
approach may not entirely resolve the endogeneity issue because the validity of our findings 
depends on the appropriateness of our instruments, these results provide some comfort that firm-
level choices do not drive our empirical results. 
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 Industry is defined at the 2-digit ICB level. Country-industry-years with fewer than 3 total firms are excluded.  All 
firms in this test are either mandatory adopters or non-adopters. 
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 Table 9, Panel A does not report the actual first stage regressions, which vary for each outcome variable based on 
data requirements and which include (following standard practice) the other control variables from the final 
specification which are not exogenous. This panel is for illustrative purposes to demonstrate instrument strength. 
26
 IFRS is not included in the second stage because the exogenous instruments can only be included in the first stage. 
All other control variables from Table 6 are included.  We find similar results if we use only mandatory IFRS 
adoption as an instrument for FACTOR1 and FACTOR2. However, the outcomes regressions can only be estimated 
including one of the two factors at a time in order for the equation to be identified. 
27
 In robustness tests, we estimate the specifications in Panels B and C of Table 9 with additional controls for the 
average level of all control and outcome variables for the industry peers to mitigate the possibility that our results 
could be driven by the effect of peer incentives (which could be correlated with firm-level incentives and disclosure) 





XII. Mandatory IFRS Adoption and Economic Outcomes 
In our final analysis, we examine the association between cross-sectional differences in 
the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption and our economic outcome variables. We identify firms 
whose textual disclosure appears to have significantly improved around IFRS adoption and 
compare their outcomes to firms which show less improvement. Our prediction from Hypothesis 
4.b is that firms which experienced the greatest increase in ―desirable attributes‖ around IFRS 
(disclosure length and comparability based on Factor 1 above) experienced greater increases in 
liquidity, analyst following, and institutional investment, while those that experienced increases 
in ―undesirable attributes‖ (boilerplate and Fog based on Factor 2 above) experienced  reduced 
benefits. This analysis allows us to investigate the extent to which the benefits of IFRS adoption 
varied based on its impact on firms’ textual reporting. 
To identify high and low quality IFRS implementers, we examine changes in disclosure 
in the year of IFRS implementation. Firms that experienced increases in Factor1 (length and 
comparability) in the top quintile of firms in 2005 are identified as ―high benefit implementers‖ 
(HBen=1), while firms that experienced large increases in Factor 2 (boilerplate and Fog) are 
identified as ―low benefit implementers‖ (LBen=1).
28
  This approach is similar to Daske et al. 
(2013) who identify ―serious‖ adopters of IFRS by isolating those which had large changes in 
accounting accruals, reporting incentives, or analyst following in the year of IFRS adoption.   
 Table 10 Panels A and B report the results of these tests.  The dependent variables are the 
four outcome variables introduced in Table 6—liquidity, analyst following, and institutional 
ownership. The independent variables of interest are the variables relating to IFRS adoption. As 
in Table 7, we include POST x MANDATORY to capture the difference-in-differences effect of 
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mandatory IFRS adoption, but here we are measuring the effect on our economic outcomes 
instead of textual attributes. To the extent that mandatory IFRS adoption improved financial 
reporting in general, we expect to observe an increase in liquidity, analyst following, and 
institutional ownership around IFRS adoption. In addition, consistent with Hypothesis 4.b, we 
expect the benefits of mandatory adoption to vary based on its effect on the textual variables. We 
predict that high benefit implementers (HBen=1) will receive greater benefits of IFRS adoption 
than low benefit implementers (LBen=1). We test that prediction by interacting the POST x 
MANDATORY variable with our high and low benefit implementation indicators (HBen and 
LBen).  We expect the interaction POST x MANDATORY x HBen to be positively associated 
with liquidity, analyst following, and institutional ownership, and the interaction POST x 




 The results in Table 10, Panel A are consistent with the predictions in Hypothesis 4.b. 
The positive (negative) coefficient on POST x MANDATORY for analyst following (illiquidity) 
suggests that mandatory IFRS adoption had a positive effect on liquidity and analyst following 
overall. More importantly, the interactions with HBen and LBen suggest that firms with greater 
increases in ―good‖ disclosure attributes experienced relatively greater benefits to liquidity, 
analyst following, and institutional ownership, while firms with increases in ―bad‖ disclosure 
attributes had reduced benefits of adoption.
30
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 The POST x MANDATORY x HBen (LBen) interactions capture the incremental effects for firms with the 
greatest changes in textual attributes relative to the typical IFRS-adopting firm. We omit the main effects for POST, 
MANDATORY, HBen and LBen because they are redundant given the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects. 
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 Based on the point estimates, low quality implementers experienced essentially no benefit to analyst following 
and a negative change in institutional ownership around IFRS adoption. The notion that beneficial effects of IFRS 





A potential issue with the preceding approach, which is shared with other research such 
as Daske et al. (2013), is the fact that, while IFRS was largely exogenous from the standpoint of 
the firm, variation in disclosure changes around IFRS adoption may not only reflect exogenous 
variation in the effects of new disclosure requirements but also firm-level implementation 
choices.  To abstract from firm-level choices, we use the fact that IFRS requirements likely 
differed systematically in terms of how they affected the disclosure in particular industries to 
specify an instrumental variables analysis that focuses on IFRS effects at the industry level.  For 
example, the impact of standards such as financial instruments and derivatives (IFRS 7), 
employee benefits and pensions (IAS19), share-based payments (IFRS 2), provisions and 
contingencies (IAS 37), property, plant and equipment (IAS 16), intangibles (IAS 38), asset 
impairments (IAS 36), and leases (IAS 17) likely varied based on industry. 
 We exploit this potential variation in the effects of IFRS in the instrumental variables 
analysis in Table 10, Panel B. Our first-stage instruments are the indicator variables for 3-digit 
ICB industry, as well as their interactions with the POST x MANDATORY variable.
31
  Although 
the results are weaker in Panel B, we find consistent evidence that differences in disclosure 
around IFRS adoption were associated with firm outcomes.  Firms in industries for which 
increases around IFRS adoption were greater for Factor 1 (length and comparability) experienced 
significantly higher increases in liquidity as measured by zero return days as well as analyst 
following, while firms in industries for which increases around IFRS adoption were greater for 
Factor 2 (boilerplate and Fog) experienced significant reductions in the effect of IFRS on 
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(2002) and demonstrated in an accounting context in Beaver et al. (2012), and are especially important in this 
analysis because the industry dummies themselves are perfectly collinear with the firm fixed effects and are thus 





liquidity as measured by zero return days and analyst following.
32
  Subject to the caveat that the 
IV results in Panel B may not entirely address endogeneity and could be biased if our 
instruments are sufficiently weak, these results provide evidence of variation in the benefits of 
IFRS adoption across firms in addition to the overall IFRS effects considered in our earlier 
analyses. 
   
XIII. Conclusions 
There is a substantial existing literature on determinants and consequences of accounting 
measurement, particularly with respect to net income and shareholders’ equity, for broad samples 
of global firms and around major events such as IFRS adoption.  While accounting measurement 
is clearly important, the associated textual disclosure is likely to be at least as important, yet it 
has attracted much less attention due, at least in part, to the difficulty in gathering large samples 
of non-US annual reports and in quantifying textual data.  Our goal in this paper is to provide 
some of the first evidence on determinants and outcomes of annual report textual characteristics 
for a broad sample of non-US firms over time.   
We focus on textual characteristics—quantity of disclosure, boilerplate, Fog, and 
comparability with US and non-US peer firms—that are likely to be of interest to regulators, 
investors, and other users of annual report information.  Our results suggest that annual report 
textual disclosure quality appears to be higher (more disclosure, less boilerplate, and greater 
comparability with non-US and US peers) in contexts with more stringent accounting standards, 
stronger oversight, and greater demand for information (e.g., IFRS, US GAAP, cross listing, and 
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correlated with firm-level incentives and to remove any direct effects of industry-level outcome variables on firm-





Big-5 auditing).  Further, our textual attributes are correlated with economic outcomes such as 
liquidity, analyst following, and mutual fund ownership.  This finding is robust to an 
instrumental variables analysis using mandatory IFRS adoption and peer attributes as 
instruments. Finally, differences in the effects of IFRS adoption on textual disclosure are 
associated with variation in market outcomes; firms with the greatest increases in beneficial 
disclosure (length and comparability) benefit more from IFRS while those with increases in poor 
disclosure attributes (boilerplate and Fog) experienced smaller benefits.  
While admittedly somewhat exploratory, we believe our results are likely to be of interest 
to regulators, standard setters, investors, and other researchers going forward.  There is clearly 
scope for additional research focusing on more specific aspects of textual disclosure and 
developing more sophisticated measures.  Our conclusions are subject to important caveats.  
While our measures appear to behave in a manner consistent with expectations, they are 
exploratory.  Further, it is difficult to infer causality, even using shocks such as mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Finally, our sample is limited to English language reports and thus cannot speak to the 
effects of non-English disclosure.  Overall, though, we view our analysis to be a potentially 
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BOILERPLATE = the percent of words in the annual report that are in boilerplate 
sentences. 
 
FACTOR1 = the first factor produced in a factor analysis of the main textual 
characteristics, driven mostly by LN_NBWORDS, XUS_COMP, and US_COMP. 
 
FACTOR2 = the second factor produced in a factor analysis of the main textual 
characteristics, driven mostly by FOG and BOILERPLATE. 
 
FOG = the Gunning Fog index calculated as (words_per_sentence + 
percent_complex_words)*0.4. 
 
IFRS_COMP = a version of the XUS_COMP measure that is only calculated within 
IFRS adoption peer groups. That is, non-adopters are only compared with non-
adopters, and adopters are only compared with other adopters. 
 
HBen = an indicator variable equal to one if the change in FACTOR1 in the year of IFRS 
adoption was in the top quintile for all firms. 
 
LBen = an indicator variable equal to one if the change in FACTOR2 in the year of IFRS 
adoption was in the top quintile for all firms. 
 
LN_NBWORDS = the natural log of the total number of non-boilerplate words in firm i’s 
annual report. 
 
LN_WORDS = the natural log of the total number of words in firm i’s annual report. 
 
MEAN_PEER_FACTOR1 = the average level of the variable FACTOR1 for firms in the 
same country-industry-year (where industry is the 2-digit ICB code), excluding 
the current firm. 
 
MEAN_PEER_FACTOR2 = the average level of the variable FACTOR2 for firms in the 
same country-industry-year (where industry is the 2-digit ICB code), excluding 
the current firm. 
 
NUM_WORDS(x) = the total number of words in the annual report (to the xth power). 
 
TOPIC_N = the topic loading of the Nth LDA topic in a given topic (interpretable as the 
weight of Topic N in the document). 
 
US_COMP = the median aggregate cosine similarity of the annual report of a firm with a 





procedures and after deleting all words not found in the Loughran McDonald 
English business dictionary. 
 
XUS_COMP = the median aggregate cosine similarity of the annual report of a firm with 
a matched sample of non-US firms outside of the firm’s home country that are in 
the same industry after stemming and stopwording procedures and after deleting 




ANALYST = the number of unique analysts issuing forecasts for firm i's earnings. 
 
LN_BIDASK = the median bid ask spread over the fiscal year, where the bid ask spread 
is defined as (ask–bid)/((ask+bid)/2). We take the natural log to reduce skewness. 
 
INST_OWN = the percent of the firm’s total common stock outstanding that is currently 
held by institutional investors, constructed using data from the Thomson Reuter’s 
International Mutual Fund (TIMF) database. See Maffett (2012) for more 
information on this database. 
 
ZERO_RETURN = the percent of the total trading days in the year where the firm had a 




ADR = an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm has an American Depository Receipt. 
 
AGE = age of a firm in years, approximated using its date of initial coverage in 
Datastream, following Maffett (2012). 
 
BIG5 = an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm has a Big-5 auditor. 
 
BM_RATIO = book-to-market ratio, using book value of common equity divided by 
market value of common equity. 
 
EARN_SURPRISE = change in earnings per common share, scaled by price of common 
shares at the end of the prior year. 
 
IFRS = an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm uses International Financial Reporting 
Standards. 
 
LEVERAGE = total debt (short-term + long-term) divided by total assets. 
 






MANDATORY = an indicator variable coded 1 if a firm mandatorily adopted IFRS in 
2005. 
 
MEAN_PEER_ADR = the percent of firms in the same country-industry-year (where 
industry is the 2-digit ICB code) that have an ADR, excluding the current firm. 
 
MEAN_PEER_BIG5 = the percent of firms in the same country-industry-year (where 
industry is the 2-digit ICB code) that have a Big 5 auditor, excluding the current 
firm. 
 
POST = an indicator variable coded 1 if the fiscal year is 2005 or later. 
 
ROA = return on assets. Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
 
NI_LOSS = an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm reports a loss. 
 
US_GAAP = an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm uses US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles. 
 
(XUS/US/IFRS)_ROA_DIST = the median absolute difference between a firm’s return 
on assets and that of the firm peers used to calculate its COMP, for both the US 
and non-US peers, as well as non-US peers within IFRS groups. 
 
(XUS/US/IFRS)_SIZE_DIST = the median difference between a firm’s size (lagged total 
assets) and that of the firm peers used to calculate its COMP, divided by lagged 
total assets. Calculated for both US and non-US peers, as well as non-US peers 










We convert the PDF version of the annual reports to text files using the Xpdf and QPDF 
software programs. The conversion of PDF files to text can sometimes lead to garbled output and 
makes it difficult to identify tables. To deal with this, we first use the Lingua::EN::Sentence Perl 
module to break the text of each report into sentences. Then we remove all ―sentences‖ that do 
not contain at least 50% alphabetic characters, similar to Li (2008) and Miller (2010), and delete 
sentences where more than 20% of the characters are not alphanumeric (usually because they 
contain foreign language characters or symbols added by a conversion error). We also exclude 
lines consisting of fewer than 50 alphabetic characters, for example page headings. 
This procedure does not successfully delete all table labels because the PDF conversion 
process can separate the numbers and labels in tables into separate ―sentences.‖ This adds noise 
to the fog measure, which is not designed to analyze this type of content, but is appropriate to 
include in the other textual measures, such as comparability, under the assumption that the text in 
tables is widely read and includes relevant information for financial statement users. 
 We use the Lingua::EN::Fathom module to calculate the Fog score, total word count, and 
document word vectors for the remaining text. We further process these word vectors before 
using them to calculate comparability by removing all stop words such as ―the‖ and ―and‖ and by 
stemming the remaining words.
33
 We require each of these word stems to be present in the 
Loughran and McDonald business word list (February 2013 version).
34
 Restricting the words to 
this dictionary helps us avoid including proper nouns or words from foreign languages. 
                                                     
33
 We use the stop words list in the Lingua::Stopwords Perl module. Stemming is the process of removing 
grammatical endings from words in order to combine words with similar meanings. We stem words using the 
Lingua::Stem::En Perl module which uses the Porter stemming algorithm. 
34





 The preceding procedures generally do a good job at editing and cleaning English 
documents but are not able to identify all foreign language documents or all documents with 
conversion errors. To exclude these, we delete annual reports that have fog scores less than 12 or 
greater than 30, those that do not have at least 50 sentences, those with fewer than 100 words, 
those with fewer than 30 unique word stems, and those where the ratio of the total number of 
words to the number of unique word stems is greater than 60. Next, we delete all observations 




) percentile within 
the firm’s country. Lastly, we exclude all firm-years where the firm’s annual report appears to be 
an SEC filing in order to prevent US regulatory language being spuriously linked with 
determinants or outcomes of disclosure when they are really driven by SEC requirements. 
In order to merge our annual reports with financial data, we match the company name 
associated with each report with company names in the Osiris and Datastream databases. Most 
names do not have a perfect match, so we standardize common business terms (such as 
―Incorporation‖ to Inc) and delete stop words. For any remaining names we fuzzy match using 
the Compged command in SAS. We accept matches with a score of 200 or less (for comparison, 
the score for ―Gold Mine Inc‖ and ―Gold Mines Inc‖ is 100). We hand checked remaining 
unmatched firms for countries which still had more than five percent of the names unmatched. 
Most of the remaining unmatched firms were delisted firms or subsidiaries of larger companies. 
Comparability Measures 
To construct the comparability measures, we first calculate the cosine similarity of a 
firm’s annual report with each of its non-US and US peers, respectively, by taking the dot 
product of their document word vectors scaled by the product of their lengths:
35
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 The word vectors weight each word by the number of times it occurs in the document, but there are other 





                          
   
          
 
By scaling by the lengths of the vectors, cosine similarity abstracts from differences in 
documents driven solely by length.
36
 Our final comparability measure is the median
37
 cosine 
similarity of a firm’s annual report with all of its peer firms, where non-US 3-digit ICB peers 
outside of the home country in the same industry-year are used to calculate XUS_COMP and US 
3-digit ICB peers are used to calculate US_COMP:
38
 
                                           
                                        
To ensure that regression results are not driven by the quality of our peer matches, we 
calculate four match quality measures that are the median distance between a firm’s lagged total 
assets and its return on assets relative to its peer firms, for both US and non-US peers. We 
include these measures as controls in all regressions that contain comparability. 
Boilerplate 
 We identify boilerplate disclosure by first counting all tetragrams contained in each 
document in our sample, where a tetragram is an ordered group of four words within a single 
sentence. We aggregate these counts by country and discard tetragrams that do not occur in at 
least 30% of the documents of a country or on average at least 5 times per document. Sentences 
                                                                                                                                                                           
idf approach which gives lower weight to very common words. Our approach is suited to our setting because we are 
interested in the relative frequency of words and topics, not just their presence as in Peterson et al. (2012). We also 
mitigate the effect of extremely common words by discarding stop words.  The tf-idf approach would be 
inappropriate if words common in a business setting (e.g. ―income‖) were informative and relevant to comparability.  
36
 Brown and Tucker (2011) show that cosine similarity can still be affected by document length because longer 
documents are more likely to contain any given word. They adjust cosine similarity for length by removing the 
variation explained by its first five moments. We include these moments in our regressions of the determinants of 
our comparability measures and BOILERPLATE to ensure that results are not driven by length. 
37
 Results were similar when we instead used the mean. 
38
 Yip and Young (2012) argue that a good measure of comparability will show that economically similar firms have 
higher comparability than economically dissimilar firms. In untabulated tests, we show that non-US and US peers in 





that contain a tetragram that occurs in at least 60% of the documents in the firm’s home country 
are flagged as unusually common and potentially boilerplate.
39
  
Examination of these phrases indicates that this procedure can capture common 
innocuous phrases (such as ―as a result of‖) and regulatory disclosure in addition to potential 
boilerplate phrases.  Because we would like our measure of boilerplate to capture uninformative, 
formulaic disclosure that the firm includes in its annual report, we exclude these innocuous 
common phrases as well as regulatory phrases and phrases from the auditor’s letter. We 
conjecture (and inspection of the data confirms) that these phrases can be identified by excluding 
the most common phrases across documents. Therefore, our final identification of boilerplate 
excludes sentences which include common tetragrams that appear in more than 80% of the 
sample documents within that country. Testing this approach in the familiar regulatory 
environment of the United States, we see that this simple rule removes phrases that are clearly 
linked with mandatory disclosure (for example the report on internal controls) as well as 
innocuous ―grammatical‖ phrases.
40
 We define our boilerplate measure, BOILERPLATE, as the 
percent of the total words in the annual report in boilerplate sentences. 
It is possible that the remaining sentences may contain informative content. Therefore, in 
robustness tests we did not classify sentences as boilerplate if they contained potentially 
informative numbers (years, numbered accounting standards, item numbers, and numbered lists 
are not considered informative, following Blankespoor 2014). In another alternative measure, we 
only classified sentences as boilerplate if the combination of boilerplate phrases and 
                                                     
39
 Although trigrams (groups of three words) are commonly used to identify similar phrases across texts, Barrett et 
al. 2006 indicate that legal texts may require the use of tetragrams. While annual reports are not legal documents, 
they often contain many legal phrases and financial jargon. Tests using trigrams to identify boilerplate disclosure 
indicated that tetragrams fare better in this setting. 
40
 In robustness, we separated regulatory and ―innocuous‖ phrases using their average frequency within documents 
(regulatory phrases will occur in many documents but only once or twice per document). Allowing the ―innocuous‖ 
phrases to be classified as boilerplate made no difference in the inferences of our study, but conceptually and 





(uninformative) stop words in the sentence comprised at least 60% of its length. These more 
restrictive measures of boilerplate are positively correlated with our main measure and did not 
affect inferences. 
We are not the first to attempt to measure boilerplate disclosure. Nelson and Pritchard 
(2007) use word phrases to compare a firm’s disclosure over time.
41
  McMullin (2013) uses word 
phrases to identify parts of a firm’s footnotes that are the same as those of matched peers to 
assess factors that drive similarity of disclosure across firms. Our measure differs because we 
capture disclosure that is redundant across many firms and therefore unlikely to be informative. 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
LDA is an unsupervised machine-learning approach developed by Blei et al. (2003) to 
identify the topics contained in a large corpus of text.
42
  Because LDA is unsupervised, it is 
replicable and free of researcher bias, but the topics can be difficult to interpret. The only 
parameter the researcher chooses is the number of topics to generate which requires some trial 
and error to avoid topics that are too broad or too narrow. We use the MALLET software 
developed by Andrew McCallum to generate the topics and topic loadings for our entire 
document collection, where the topic loading is a measure of how prominent a given topic is 
within an individual document and can be roughly interpreted as the proportion of the document 
comprising that topic. We generate 100 topics following Ball et al. (2013); topics were similar, 




                                                     
41
 We also calculated a measure of the similarity of a firm’s disclosure over time, or disclosure ―stickiness,‖ using 
cosine similarity, similar to Brown and Tucker (2011). The resulting measure is positively correlated with our 
measure of boilerplate and our results are robust to its inclusion as a control.   
42
 LDA has only recently been used in accounting and finance. Ball et al. (2013) use LDA to identify topics within 
the MD&A. Huang et al. (2014) examine the topics discussed in conference calls and analyst reports. Hoberg & 
Lewis (2014) examine changes in the content of a firm’s MD&A around fraudulent behaviors that result in AAERs. 
43
 We refer readers to the excellent discussion in Huang et al. (2014) for a more detailed explanation of the 






Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
ARGENTINA 6 7 8 5 10 10 12 14 10 16 15 11 13 10 147
AUSTRALIA 117 177 297 580 548 662 686 664 1120 1236 1126 900 1128 157 9398
AUSTRIA 8 22 35 37 41 38 41 42 53 54 58 57 47 43 576
BELGIUM 11 32 33 62 57 56 49 54 70 67 72 58 59 63 743
BRAZIL 5 11 18 24 21 18 23 21 32 30 42 98 104 57 504
CANADA 298 433 539 592 698 658 616 758 935 1104 1065 1422 1388 1147 11653
CHILE 4 7 11 11 6 7 13 8 13 11 14 7 3 6 121
CHINA . 15 37 55 85 95 106 121 110 114 129 153 194 232 1446
CZECH REPUBLIC 12 16 18 22 17 20 17 12 8 8 7 6 4 2 169
DENMARK 28 41 64 64 65 78 71 75 86 79 76 92 82 68 969
FINLAND 32 53 65 77 87 93 92 90 100 89 105 94 87 97 1161
FRANCE 37 75 99 110 138 159 157 171 141 166 177 190 182 132 1934
GERMANY 44 104 169 250 265 301 295 306 319 334 349 343 317 296 3692
GREECE 2 . 4 1 9 8 5 14 11 18 11 13 9 4 109
HONG KONG 40 57 130 171 183 181 178 175 181 179 165 177 183 147 2147
INDIA 8 24 50 60 238 272 358 408 719 804 827 1235 1234 52 6289
INDONESIA 2 6 31 35 29 29 49 60 83 119 133 139 172 225 1112
IRELAND 16 28 31 34 38 36 37 38 47 49 47 40 45 33 519
ISRAEL 5 8 21 32 34 39 42 42 57 50 47 39 31 20 467
ITALY 17 39 62 57 84 104 109 116 141 120 109 106 118 101 1283
JAPAN 296 447 514 552 438 472 594 609 446 405 357 337 219 14 5700
KOREA (SOUTH) 11 21 35 40 46 47 42 37 42 30 22 35 21 14 443
LUXEMBOURG 2 6 5 8 12 15 18 14 19 22 16 17 18 18 190
MEXICO 17 22 24 25 24 30 29 24 29 34 28 28 30 10 354
NETHERLANDS 14 42 75 74 96 95 91 89 90 63 94 93 80 78 1074
NEW ZEALAND 13 29 39 55 70 76 76 97 97 109 106 105 93 18 983
NORWAY 34 55 63 58 67 73 76 76 77 96 103 120 118 108 1124
PAKISTAN 5 5 10 11 20 28 36 60 81 89 72 89 67 17 590
PHILIPPINES 4 10 18 12 31 141 138 156 156 144 137 142 140 132 1361
POLAND 2 3 9 18 17 24 35 35 46 40 53 88 101 40 511
PORTUGAL . 11 10 10 11 14 11 14 18 17 21 23 21 19 200
RUSSIA . . 2 6 7 8 12 11 19 20 25 35 34 33 212
SINGAPORE 23 68 126 281 325 349 337 330 449 443 443 471 456 337 4438
SOUTH AFRICA 18 42 92 127 158 157 173 186 181 171 203 230 230 80 2048
SPAIN 7 19 30 35 37 49 42 54 61 58 51 67 54 32 596
SRI LANKA . 1 4 5 9 11 9 26 33 80 141 153 134 30 636
SWEDEN 55 90 113 121 138 146 156 151 163 170 148 138 163 123 1875
SWITZERLAND 36 72 111 127 144 141 151 154 163 164 163 169 155 159 1909
TAIWAN 1 9 12 22 46 55 38 44 59 56 56 70 31 29 528
THAILAND 8 15 30 230 272 280 294 310 381 395 402 415 266 403 3701
TURKEY . 1 7 16 25 44 55 60 51 61 61 88 83 98 650
UNITED KINGDOM 238 595 770 841 935 1041 1113 1068 1338 1583 1554 1367 1089 514 14046
Total 1476 2718 3821 4953 5581 6160 6482 6794 8235 8897 8830 9460 9003 5198 87608








Variable N Mean Median Std P25 P75
LN_WORDS     87,608 9.733 9.758 0.671 9.299 10.184
LN_NBWORDS     87,608 9.664 9.686 0.679 9.225 10.118
BOILERPLATE     85,911 7.045 7.052 3.649 4.136 9.635
XUS_COMP     84,997 0.682 0.690 0.069 0.643 0.732
US_COMP     86,060 0.632 0.636 0.059 0.598 0.671
FOG     85,793 19.520 19.561 1.731 18.270 20.805
ZERO_RETURN     82,253 27.974 17.375 27.676 5.118 45.783
LN_BIDASK     63,905 0.046 0.018 0.072 0.007 0.051
ANALYST     50,599 5.417 3.000 5.410 1.000 8.000
INST_OWN     52,161 10.736 6.702 11.859 1.432 16.011
LN_MVE     87,608 11.730 11.648 2.243 10.116 13.286
ROA     86,008 -0.029 0.025 0.236 -0.024 0.065
BIG5     87,608 0.499 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
IFRS     87,608 0.337 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000
US_GAAP     87,608 0.012 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000
ADR     87,608 0.008 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.000
BM_RATIO     86,195 0.984 0.723 1.022 0.389 1.220
LEVERAGE     86,125 0.209 0.168 0.201 0.019 0.337
EARN_SURPRISE     85,907 0.041 0.008 0.289 -0.031 0.057
NI_LOSS     87,608 0.309 0.000 0.462 0.000 1.000
AGE     87,608 13.129 11.157 9.352 5.676 17.829
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Primary Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Std P25 P75
ZERO_RETURN   250,828 27.649 15.873 27.563 5.976 44.534
LN_BIDASK   190,983 0.043 0.016 0.071 0.006 0.047
ANALYST   119,563 4.859 2.000 5.392 1.000 7.000
INST_OWN   159,114 7.167 2.890 9.833 0.395 10.083
LN_MVE   266,295 11.409 11.266 2.218 9.910 12.786
ROA   260,972 -0.023 0.020 0.211 -0.017 0.057
BIG5   266,295 0.367 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000
IFRS   266,295 0.216 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.000
US_GAAP   266,295 0.018 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.000
ADR   266,295 0.020 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.000
BM_RATIO   260,951 1.137 0.794 1.305 0.414 1.403
LEVERAGE   261,031 0.226 0.192 0.206 0.035 0.359
EARN_SURPRISE   260,971 0.041 0.005 0.333 -0.036 0.055
NI_LOSS   266,295 0.300 0.000 0.458 0.000 1.000
AGE   261,245 12.201 10.637 8.041 5.919 16.266












Country N LN_MVE ROA % ADR N LN_MVE ROA % ADR
Non-English 34,136 12.643 0.028 0.016 164,624 11.538 0.022 0.023
English-Speaking 53,472 11.052 0.021 0.003 101,671 10.754 0.017 0.015
Panel C: Comparison of our sample with the Datastream population by Language Group
Our Sample Datastream Population
Year N NUM_WORDS BOILERPLATE XUS_COMP US_COMP FOG LN_MVE
1998 1476 11611.5 5.86 0.62 0.62 18.3 12.99
1999 2718 11778.5 6.51 0.64 0.61 18.5 12.66
2000 3821 12038 6.85 0.64 0.61 18.8 12.26
2001 4953 12017 7.21 0.65 0.61 19.1 11.58
2002 5581 13340 7.52 0.66 0.62 19.1 11.34
2003 6160 14399.5 7.87 0.66 0.62 19.3 11.32
2004 6482 15603 7.91 0.67 0.62 19.3 11.85
2005 6794 17873 7.48 0.69 0.64 19.5 12.01
2006 8235 18072 7.59 0.7 0.64 19.6 11.66
2007 8897 19874 7.1 0.71 0.64 19.9 11.80
2008 8830 21060 6.89 0.72 0.65 20 11.36
2009 9460 20984.5 6.72 0.72 0.65 19.9 11.01
2010 9003 22298 6.74 0.72 0.65 20 11.33
2011 5198 24860.5 5.42 0.73 0.65 20.4 11.85
Panel D: Median Text Characteristics by Year
Country N NUM_WORDS BOILERPLATE XUS_COMP US_COMP FOG LN_MVE
ARGENTINA 147 4475.09 1.99 -0.03 0.02 -0.54 12.99
AUSTRALIA 9398 2184.36 1.51 0.01 -0.01 1.46 10.48
AUSTRIA 576 2221.18 -2.15 0 0 -1.46 12.60
BELGIUM 743 -33.8 -2.82 0.01 0 -1.12 12.82
BRAZIL 504 -9716.75 -2.82 0 0.03 0.57 13.49
CANADA 11653 -4741.51 -5.1 0 0.05 0.05 10.75
CHILE 121 2327.67 -2.47 0 0.02 -1.23 14.06
CHINA 1446 6378.58 5.23 0.01 0 1.92 11.48
CZECH REPUBLIC 169 6425.21 -3.4 -0.02 0 -1.46 11.62
DENMARK 969 -2161.46 -2.92 0.02 0 -0.8 12.02
FINLAND 1161 344.69 -2.46 0.02 0.01 -1.5 12.13
FRANCE 1934 7305.23 -2.75 0 -0.01 -0.02 13.29
GERMANY 3692 5686.8 -0.55 -0.01 0 -1.38 12.00
GREECE 109 -6648.29 -6.29 0.01 -0.03 -1.97 12.92
HONG KONG 2147 1751.43 3.82 0.03 -0.02 1.95 11.96
INDIA 6289 -912.42 1.21 -0.01 0 -2.24 11.42






INDONESIA 1112 4524.51 2.52 -0.17 -0.14 1.21 10.97
IRELAND 519 -1681.75 -0.6 0.05 -0.01 0.13 11.69
ISRAEL 467 2637.64 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.16 12.29
ITALY 1283 10325.32 1.67 -0.01 -0.01 -1.44 13.27
JAPAN 5700 -13302.99 1.83 -0.01 0.02 0.46 14.09
KOREA (SOUTH) 443 -11528.83 -0.78 -0.01 0.02 0.42 14.07
LUXEMBOURG 190 -3844.57 -5.37 0.03 -0.01 -0.94 13.23
MEXICO 354 -9618.87 -1.51 0.02 0.06 -0.87 13.85
NETHERLANDS 1074 1486.33 -4.14 0 0 -1.65 12.79
NEW ZEALAND 983 -3669.1 -1.74 0.02 -0.02 0.28 11.10
NORWAY 1124 821.62 -3.88 0.02 0.01 -1.6 11.97
PAKISTAN 590 -4075.44 3.9 0.04 0.03 -0.85 11.57
PHILIPPINES 1361 5866.55 1.8 0 0.05 -0.63 10.36
POLAND 511 2493.85 -1.65 -0.01 -0.04 -0.84 12.62
PORTUGAL 200 16101.53 2.92 0.01 0 0.15 14.25
RUSSIA 212 -4344.28 -3.82 0.01 -0.01 1.41 14.62
SINGAPORE 4438 3506.21 2.61 0.04 0 1.35 10.80
SOUTH AFRICA 2048 3253.6 0.98 0.04 -0.01 2 11.83
SPAIN 596 6827.25 -3.11 0 -0.03 -0.54 14.50
SRI LANKA 636 -599.33 0.6 0.04 0 -2.07 9.37
SWEDEN 1875 2830.04 -2.13 -0.01 -0.01 -1.11 12.21
SWITZERLAND 1909 -3227.41 -3.18 0.02 0 -1.14 12.84
TAIWAN 528 -11347.27 -0.35 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 14.02
THAILAND 3701 -10589.63 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 10.45
TURKEY 650 -1971.68 -1.39 -0.01 -0.01 -0.48 12.69
UNITED KINGDOM 14046 -1287.58 1.18 0.03 0 0.23 11.33
Panel A reports summary statistics for the variables used in our paper. Panel B reports summary statistics for the 
entire Datastream population in the same country-years. Panel C compares median size, profitability and percent of 
firms with an ADR for our sample and the entire Datastream population, partioning by whether the firm's country 
of origin is English-speaking or not. Panel D reports median textual characteristics for each year in our sample. 
Panel E reports median textual characteristics by country. In order to adjust for sample composition, and for ease 
of comparison across groups, the text variables in Panel E have been adjusted for size and year. Inferences about 
the trends and patterns in Panels D and E are robust to controlling (or not controlling) for a wide range of 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
LN_NBWORDS 1 -0.106 0.290 0.260 -0.059 0.463 0.136 0.231 0.370 0.029 0.067
BOILERPLATE 2 -0.105 0.116 -0.136 0.203 -0.146 0.035 -0.134 -0.081 -0.064 -0.023
XUS_COMP 3 0.301 0.109 0.590 0.232 -0.098 -0.065 0.040 0.324 -0.018 0.004
US_COMP 4 0.271 -0.157 0.521 0.027 0.112 -0.012 0.062 0.136 0.083 0.052
FOG 5 -0.061 0.212 0.259 0.020 -0.229 -0.172 -0.035 0.102 -0.037 -0.014
LN_MVE 6 0.456 -0.153 -0.111 0.118 -0.244 0.306 0.239 0.044 0.066 0.134
ROA 7 0.133 0.049 -0.047 -0.031 -0.155 0.318 0.101 -0.048 -0.009 0.021
BIG5 8 0.234 -0.138 0.040 0.057 -0.041 0.247 0.115 0.063 0.019 0.021
IFRS 9 0.372 -0.081 0.355 0.148 0.099 0.043 -0.026 0.063 -0.078 -0.027
US_GAAP 10 0.029 -0.065 -0.025 0.086 -0.041 0.054 -0.015 0.019 -0.078 0.086
ADR 11 0.065 -0.025 0.002 0.055 -0.015 0.113 0.029 0.021 -0.027 0.086
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
LN_NBWORDS 1 -0.106 0.290 0.260 -0.059 -0.333 -0.281 0.279 0.218
BOILERPLATE 2 -0.105 0.116 -0.136 0.203 0.180 0.072 -0.128 -0.111
XUS_COMP 3 0.301 0.109 0.590 0.232 0.122 0.135 -0.030 0.080
US_COMP 4 0.271 -0.157 0.521 0.027 -0.115 -0.024 0.067 0.070
FOG 5 -0.061 0.212 0.259 0.020 0.295 0.257 -0.108 -0.107
ZERO_RETURN 6 -0.364 0.147 0.110 -0.140 0.313 0.675 -0.384 -0.149
LN_BIDASK 7 -0.374 0.148 0.176 -0.085 0.312 0.782 -0.274 -0.146
ANALYST 8 0.279 -0.161 -0.065 0.078 -0.133 -0.457 -0.558 0.229
INST_OWN 9 0.229 -0.151 0.047 0.078 -0.143 -0.232 -0.266 0.322
Pearson/Spearman Correlations given above/below the diagonal.
Panel A. Text Attributes and Select Determinants
Panel B. Text Attributes and Outcome Variables






Panel A. Mixed Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES LN_NBWORDS BOILERPLATE XUS_COMP US_COMP FOG FACTOR1 FACTOR2
IFRS 0.220*** -0.682*** 0.0197*** 0.0141*** 0.193*** 0.376*** -0.00387
(36.07) (-16.27) (26.25) (20.92) (10.70) (40.66) (-0.554)
US_GAAP 0.0881*** -1.585*** 0.0164*** 0.0370*** 0.00892 0.489*** -0.174***
(3.903) (-11.23) (5.330) (11.56) (0.149) (10.79) (-6.678)
ADR 0.117*** -0.0296 0.00969** 0.0149*** 0.192* 0.316*** 0.0269
(2.959) (-0.120) (2.214) (3.491) (1.903) (4.957) (0.745)
BIG5 0.0676*** -0.0889*** 0.00144** -0.000526 0.0215 0.0469*** -0.00673
(13.64) (-2.875) (2.493) (-1.047) (1.551) (6.250) (-1.283)
LN_MVE 0.115*** -0.0652*** -0.00508*** -0.00149*** -0.0630*** 0.0360*** -0.0634***
(67.13) (-5.537) (-21.86) (-6.861) (-12.33) (12.55) (-30.26)
BM_RATIO 0.0517*** 0.0147 -0.00209*** 0.000153 -0.0141** 0.0229*** -0.0240***
(26.80) (1.203) (-9.012) (0.720) (-2.540) (7.667) (-10.74)
LEVERAGE 0.238*** 0.256*** -0.0181*** -0.00894*** -0.566*** -0.0287 -0.195***
(18.15) (2.969) (-10.93) (-6.002) (-14.26) (-1.381) (-12.53)
ROA 0.0306*** 0.0566 -0.0203*** -0.0169*** -0.255*** -0.311*** -0.276***
(3.891) (1.076) (-6.640) (-5.111) (-10.97) (-6.222) (-7.336)
AGE -0.00150*** 0.0111*** 0.000273*** 0.000617*** -0.0159*** 0.00574*** -0.00205***
(-3.515) (4.004) (6.044) (13.63) (-12.75) (9.571) (-4.282)
NI_LOSS -0.0159*** -0.0960*** 0.000414 0.00211*** 0.0885*** 0.0113* 0.00710
(-3.947) (-3.790) (0.825) (4.878) (8.114) (1.759) (1.597)
EARN_SURPRISE 0.00899** -0.0315 0.00146*** 0.00268*** 0.106*** 0.0382*** 0.0108**
(2.097) (-1.189) (2.652) (5.611) (8.597) (5.449) (2.279)
COMP Match Quality Measures N N Y Y N Y Y
NUM_WORDS_1-5 Included N Y Y Y N N N
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Random Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 83,241 81,626 78,955 80,003 81,556 74,350 74,350
R-Squared 0.398 0.031 0.248 0.274 0.110 0.198 0.159







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES LN_NBWORDS BOILERPLATE XUS_COMP US_COMP FOG FACTOR1 FACTOR2
IFRS 0.170*** -0.783*** 0.0181*** 0.0172*** 0.160*** 0.378*** -0.0299***
(21.68) (-14.73) (18.55) (20.08) (6.944) (30.78) (-3.319)
US_GAAP 0.0650** -1.453*** 0.0175*** 0.0336*** 0.0728 0.459*** -0.132***
(2.184) (-7.532) (4.060) (7.752) (0.932) (7.057) (-3.893)
ADR 0.000288 0.446 -0.00498 -0.00618 0.122 0.00540 0.114*
(0.00320) (0.924) (-0.461) (-0.682) (0.617) (0.0330) (1.797)
BIG5 0.0214*** 0.0381 -0.000395 -0.00126** 0.00645 0.000553 0.00269
(3.356) (0.991) (-0.524) (-1.974) (0.370) (0.0559) (0.411)
LN_MVE 0.0533*** -0.00900 -0.00193*** -0.000383 -0.00664 0.0251*** -0.0277***
(16.92) (-0.469) (-4.918) (-1.080) (-0.744) (4.700) (-7.736)
BM_RATIO 0.0249*** 0.0147 -0.000388 0.000784*** 0.0106 0.0218*** -0.00927***
(9.768) (0.935) (-1.229) (2.780) (1.437) (5.262) (-3.160)
LEVERAGE 0.146*** 0.142 -0.00461* 0.00140 -0.201*** 0.0881*** -0.0879***
(7.959) (1.230) (-1.924) (0.682) (-3.755) (2.927) (-4.110)
ROA 0.00362 -0.0743 -0.00559 -0.00662 -0.125*** -0.115 -0.253***
(0.374) (-1.201) (-1.335) (-1.321) (-4.438) (-1.387) (-4.634)
AGE 0.0614 -0.547** 0.00111 -0.000740 0.152 0.0620 -0.0131
(1.549) (-2.044) (0.213) (-0.158) (1.194) (0.895) (-0.295)
NI_LOSS 0.00343 0.0113 -0.000443 0.000978* 0.0372*** 0.00758 0.00245
(0.731) (0.386) (-0.742) (1.937) (2.923) (0.991) (0.470)
EARN_SURPRISE 0.00334 0.0345 0.00111* 0.00167*** 0.0708*** 0.0231*** 0.0115**
(0.680) (1.137) (1.705) (3.015) (5.007) (2.775) (2.089)
COMP Match Quality Measures N N Y Y N Y Y
NUM_WORDS_1-5 Included N Y Y Y N N N
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 83,241 81,626 78,955 80,003 81,556 74,350 74,350
Adjusted R-Squared 0.807 0.774 0.730 0.732 0.788 0.733 0.812






Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The tests reported in this table examine the economic determinants of textual attributes. Panel A presents results from a mixed model with year fixed effects 
and firm random effects; Panel B includes firm and year fixed effects. All continuous, non-logarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles, 
except for the factors, which were formed from truncated variables. We used lagged values of LN_MVE, BM_RATIO, and LEVERAGE but current values of 
the other control variables which should be reflected in the current annual report. . We include the first five powers of NUM_WORDS to remove mechanical 
effects in boilerplate and comparability due to report length (Brown and Tucker 2011).  We also control for the peer match quality of the COMP measures 






Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2
LN_NBWORDS 0.398 -0.227 0.429 -0.161
BOILERPLATE -0.038 0.470 -0.112 0.459
XUS_COMP 0.755 0.230 0.709 0.347
US_COMP 0.741 -0.177 0.760 -0.057
FOG 0.143 0.460 0.068 0.476
Eigenvalue 1.300 0.569 - -
This table provides the results of a maximum likelihood factor analysis of our five main 
textual measures. We present both the raw factor patterns as well as the patterns generated 
after a varimax rotation of the factors. We retain two factors from the factor analysis because 
these two are able to explain at least 90% of the observed variance of the original variables. 
These two factors would also be retained in a Cattell scree test.
Factor Pattern Factor Pattern: Varimax Rotation






(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ZERO_RETURN LN_BIDASK ANALYST INST_OWN
FACTOR1 -1.190*** -0.000741 0.146*** 0.421***
(-6.828) (-1.554) (2.699) (3.336)
FACTOR2 2.226*** 0.00288*** -0.463*** -0.793***
(7.420) (3.315) (-5.183) (-3.742)
IFRS -2.667*** 0.00179* 0.907*** -0.312
(-7.222) (1.787) (7.800) (-1.150)
US_GAAP -3.402*** -0.00459*** 0.717 0.967
(-3.777) (-2.960) (1.632) (0.826)
ADR -7.559 0.00247 -3.263 -1.387
(-1.227) (0.565) (-1.605) (-0.668)
BIG5 -0.808*** -0.00170** 0.0172 0.334
(-2.691) (-2.067) (0.210) (1.626)
LN_MVE -4.079*** -0.00739*** 1.124*** 1.758***
(-21.14) (-11.00) (19.24) (10.93)
BM_RATIO -1.213*** -0.00327*** 0.298*** 0.688***
(-7.505) (-5.840) (6.239) (5.929)
LEVERAGE 0.681 0.00426 -0.374 -1.474*
(0.622) (1.073) (-1.222) (-1.864)
NI_LOSS 1.620*** 0.00444*** -0.289*** -0.483***
(6.483) (5.160) (-4.230) (-2.840)
ROA -8.111*** -0.0466*** -1.250 1.771
(-2.788) (-4.602) (-1.632) (0.769)
COMP Match Quality Measures Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 53,912 42,842 35,659 35,294
Adjusted R-Squared 0.852 0.800 0.791 0.746
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6. Economic Outcomes
This table examines the effects of our text factors on several economic outcomes. All continuous, non-
logarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles except for the factors, which were formed 
from truncated variables. We lag our independent variables to mitigate endogeneity problems. We also 
control for the quality of the peer matches of the COMP measures.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES LN_NBWORDS BOILERPLATE XUS_COMP IFRS_COMP US_COMP FOG FACTOR1 FACTOR2
POST x MANDATORY 0.201*** -0.578*** 0.0180*** 0.0466*** 0.0202*** 0.00767 0.433*** -0.0466***
(18.46) (-7.122) (12.59) (26.40) (16.17) (0.241) (24.98) (-3.815)
US_GAAP 0.0808** -1.503*** 0.0159*** 0.0135** 0.0318*** 0.0207 0.427*** -0.146***
(2.017) (-5.554) (2.944) (2.559) (5.647) (0.210) (4.954) (-3.199)
ADR 0.0711 -0.305 -0.00685 0.00664 -0.00214 0.0633 0.0512 0.0411
(0.576) (-0.760) (-0.506) (0.516) (-0.211) (0.302) (0.248) (1.026)
BIG5 0.00914 0.00285 -0.00123 0.00150 -0.00268*** 0.00956 -0.0275** 0.00384
(1.066) (0.0521) (-1.279) (1.295) (-3.229) (0.394) (-2.157) (0.425)
LN_MVE 0.0507*** -0.0430 -0.00272*** -0.000791 -0.000246 -0.0419*** 0.0190*** -0.0356***
(11.26) (-1.493) (-5.135) (-1.178) (-0.511) (-3.207) (2.609) (-7.156)
BM_RATIO 0.0236*** 0.0150 -0.00107** -0.000365 0.00106*** 0.00153 0.0194*** -0.0113***
(6.372) (0.603) (-2.397) (-0.663) (2.640) (0.137) (3.239) (-2.645)
LEVERAGE 0.134*** 0.0812 -0.00575* -0.000316 0.00500* -0.333*** 0.0943** -0.118***
(5.138) (0.478) (-1.750) (-0.0772) (1.784) (-4.296) (2.278) (-3.997)
ROA -0.00496 0.0594 -0.00466 -0.0110 -0.0112 -0.0721 -0.178 -0.197**
(-0.325) (0.558) (-0.694) (-1.425) (-1.326) (-1.536) (-1.321) (-2.511)
AGE 0.0631 -0.243 0.00475 0.00832 0.000644 0.388** 0.0688 0.0754
(1.053) (-0.633) (0.636) (0.836) (0.0925) (1.991) (0.656) (1.254)
NI_LOSS 0.00885 -0.0523 -0.000560 -0.00146 0.00103 0.0588*** 0.0119 -0.00222
(1.330) (-1.232) (-0.680) (-1.409) (1.465) (3.246) (1.115) (-0.304)
EARN_SURPRISE 0.0159** -0.0322 0.000452 0.00136 0.00124 0.0546** 0.0250** -0.00334
(2.249) (-0.662) (0.475) (1.172) (1.440) (2.517) (2.002) (-0.394)
COMP Match Quality Measures N N Y Y Y N Y Y
NUM_WORDS_1-5 Included N Y Y Y Y N N N
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 39,027 38,354 37,185 35,678 37,766 38,219 35,159 35,159
Adjusted R-Squared 0.815 0.731 0.733 0.697 0.727 0.782 0.737 0.806


























Robust t-statistics, clustered by firm, are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The tests in this table use a difference-in-differences design to examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on textual disclosure. MANDATORY is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm adopted IFRS in 2005 and was in a country that mandated IFRS for the first time in that year. POST is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the fiscal year is post 2005. POST x MANDATORY can be interpreted as the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on disclosure. POST 
and MANDATORY are excluded because they are perfectly collinear with our firm and year fixed effects. IFRS_COMP is the textual comparability with non-
US peers within  IFRS adoption groups so that (non-)adopters are only compared with other (non-)adopters. Our sample includes only those firms which have 
available data in 2004 and 2005, the year before and of IFRS adoption.
All continuous, non-logarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for the factors, which were formed from truncated variables.  As 
in Table 4, LN_MVE, BM_RATIO, and LEVERAGE are lagged. We include the first five powers of NUM_WORDS to remove mechanical effects in boilerplate 





Topic Keywords Topic Weight
1 0.006 *** (12.96) 0.218
2 0.009 *** (16.18) 0.156
3 0.033 *** (21.43) 0.110
4 0.039 *** (20.08) 0.043
5 0.009 *** (11.94) 0.043
6 0.026 *** (17.25) 0.037
7 0.008 *** (12.05) 0.028
8 0.016 *** (12.34) 0.023
9 0.014 *** (13.60) 0.017
Post-IFRS Change
Table 8. Significant Changes in Disclosure Topics around IFRS Adoption
financial, year, group, directors, statements, company, cash, report, statement, share, tax, 
assets, limited, capital, march, recognised, ended, income, balance
board, supervisory, financial, management, year, report, company, members, statements, 
thousand, cash, capital, annual, tax, meeting, liabilities, corporate, risks, risk
interest, fair, rate, instruments, derivative, financial, hedge, contracts, net, cash, income, assets, 
hedging, risk, derivatives, debt, hedges, losses, liabilities, 
options, shares, share, option, price, granted, exercise, date, plan, period, grant, number, 
issued, company, employees, total, employee, average, exercised
group, recognised, assets, tax, income, liabilities, cash, amount, impairment, financial, profit, 
cost, net, costs, fair, equity, plant, equipment, property
This table lists the top 20 keywords for LDA topics that were found to dramatically increase in annual reports after mandatory IFRS adoption. It 
also provides the values and t-statistics for the coefficient β1 from the following set of regressions: 
where Topic_N is the topic loading for the Nth topic. β1 is the effect of Mandatory IFRS adoption on the proportion of the annual report that is 
composed of Topic_N. In order to focus on topics that show the most statistically and economically significant changes around IFRS adoption, 
we report only those topics where β1 has a robust, firm-clustered t-statistic of 10 or greater. The current specification includes firm and year fixed 
effects and a control for lagged length to ensure that static firm- or year-specific factors and changes in document length do not drive the 
observed changes in topic proportions. These topics also exhibit significant increases when examined in specifications omitting length, including 
current length, or including the full set of control variables from Table 4. Topic Weight is the Dirichlet parameter for the given topic, which is 
roughly proportional to the overall portion of the collection of documents assigned to a given topic (the maximum topic weight in our set of 100 
topics is 0.318 and the minimum is 0.005).
group, year, performance, committee, executive, share, scheme, profit, board, remuneration, 
business, pension, directors, shares, tax, years, schemes, total, annual, 
directors, financial, remuneration, year, report, board, company, director, management, 
limited, tax, recognised, risk, accounting, performance, key, executive, reporting, cash, 
group, limited, year, company, directors, share, investment, profit, continued, subsidiaries, 
interest, interests, assets, note, loss, china, shares, recognised, capital
company, financial, year, group, shares, directors, director, companies, share, tax, recognised, 





   
















Prob > F-Statistic 0 0
Adjusted R-Squared 0.378 0.550






(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ZERO_RET LN_BIDASK ANALYST INST_OWN
IV_FACTOR1 -9.755*** -0.00246 2.315*** 0.432
(-8.698) (-1.021) (5.637) (0.545)
IV_FACTOR2 22.07*** 0.0289*** -5.793*** -11.71***
(6.292) (3.621) (-5.170) (-3.522)
US_GAAP 4.577*** 0.000502 -1.662*** -0.675
(2.950) (0.195) (-2.905) (-0.450)
ADR 9.776* 0.00582 -7.142*** -1.811
(1.709) (0.612) (-2.750) (-0.693)
BIG5 -0.988** -0.00202** -0.00808 0.340
(-2.448) (-2.068) (-0.0500) (1.161)
LN_MVE -3.255*** -0.00612*** 0.981*** 1.512***
(-10.94) (-7.846) (12.63) (5.700)
BM_RATIO -0.809*** -0.00247*** 0.191*** 0.763***
(-3.575) (-3.421) (2.944) (4.174)
LEVERAGE 3.133* 0.00377 -0.449 -2.419**
(1.910) (0.679) (-0.975) (-2.341)
NI_LOSS 1.874*** 0.00413*** -0.257** -0.662**
(5.604) (3.364) (-2.437) (-2.335)
ROA 0.671 -0.0369*** -3.398*** -0.519
(0.147) (-3.530) (-3.273) (-0.148)
COMP Match Quality Measures Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 24,966 20,020 17,019 18,495
R-Squared 0.269 0.191 0.208 0.050






(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ZERO_RET LN_BIDASK ANALYST INST_OWN
IV_FACTOR1 -11.35*** -0.00363 1.985*** 3.377***
(-7.974) (-1.156) (3.478) (2.753)
IV_FACTOR2 17.58*** 0.0191*** -4.753*** -9.775***
(7.249) (2.988) (-6.385) (-5.142)
IFRS 2.051*** 0.00370** -0.151 -1.911***
(2.898) (2.276) (-0.517) (-3.757)
US_GAAP 2.051*** 0.00370** -0.151 -1.911***
(2.898) (2.276) (-0.517) (-3.757)
ADR 4.340*** 0.000986 -1.117* -2.586*
(2.911) (0.359) (-1.855) (-1.923)
BIG5 11.20 0.0104 -7.053*** -2.413
(1.589) (1.634) (-3.274) (-0.831)
LN_MVE -0.782*** -0.00128* -0.0227 0.359
(-3.053) (-1.763) (-0.313) (1.620)
BM_RATIO -3.424*** -0.00671*** 0.982*** 1.461***
(-19.89) (-13.14) (15.80) (9.177)
LEVERAGE -0.900*** -0.00317*** 0.183*** 0.523***
(-6.069) (-5.930) (3.678) (4.178)
NI_LOSS 3.070*** 0.00503 -0.599 -2.315***
(3.366) (1.257) (-1.611) (-2.651)
ROA 1.814*** 0.00454*** -0.279*** -0.523***
(7.442) (5.406) (-4.275) (-3.060)
COMP Match Quality Measures Y Y Y Y
Country, Industry, Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 47,334 37,689 31,291 31,401
R-Squared 0.291 0.271 0.219 0.050
This table uses instrumental variables (IV) analysis to examine the effects of our text factors on 
several economic outcomes. Panel A provides evidence on the strength of our instruments by 
showing regressions of Factor1 and Factor2 on our exogenous variables (the actual first stage 
regressions also include the other control variables and vary in sample composition across 
specifications according to data restrictions). Panel B provides second stage estimates of the 
effect of exogenous changes in disclosure on outcomes using mandatory IFRS adoption as the 
main instrument. Panel C provides second stage estimates of the effect of disclosure on outcomes 
for the full sample of firms, using only the peer variables as instruments. All continuous, non-
logarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles except for the factors, which 
were formed from truncated variables. We lag our independent variables to mitigate endogeneity 
problems. We also control for the quality of the peer matches of the COMP measures.
Robust t-statistics clustered by firm reported in parentheses in Panel A. Bootstrapped t-statistics 
reported in Panels B and C.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1







(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ZERO_RETURN LN_BIDASK ANALYST INST_OWN
POST x MANDATORY x HBen -3.413*** -0.00200 0.870*** 1.447**
(-3.655) (-1.419) (3.685) (2.267)
POST x MANDATORY x LBen 2.048** -0.00148 -1.101*** -1.755**
(2.126) (-0.758) (-4.339) (-2.264)
POST x MANDATORY -5.516*** -0.00387*** 1.163*** 0.0603
(-8.500) (-2.603) (6.000) (0.145)
US_GAAP -3.567*** -0.00730*** 0.476 1.156
(-4.755) (-4.853) (0.997) (0.737)
ADR -6.311 0.00157 -2.833 -4.379***
(-0.928) (0.328) (-1.294) (-5.334)
BIG5 -0.681* -0.00204* 0.0147 0.159
(-1.674) (-1.876) (0.133) (0.567)
LN_MVE -4.074*** -0.00683*** 1.291*** 1.977***
(-15.24) (-7.695) (16.50) (8.834)
BM_RATIO -0.992*** -0.00264*** 0.371*** 0.955***
(-4.164) (-3.158) (5.218) (5.522)
LEVERAGE 0.218 0.00207 -0.0893 -1.674
(0.137) (0.374) (-0.206) (-1.524)
NI_LOSS 1.732*** 0.00382*** -0.301*** -0.667***
(4.824) (3.337) (-3.111) (-2.902)
ROA -6.013 -0.0346** -2.323** 3.014
(-1.436) (-2.382) (-1.980) (0.877)
COMP Match Quality Measures Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 24,198 19,361 16,766 18,149
Adjusted R-Squared 0.827 0.788 0.793 0.745
Table 10. The Effect of Textual Attributes on the Benefits of IFRS Adoption






(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ZERO_RETURN LN_BIDASK ANALYST INST_OWN
IV_POST x MANDATORY x HBen -13.95*** -0.00127 2.044*** -1.175
(-3.617) (-0.199) (2.911) (-0.543)
IV_POST x MANDATORY x LBen 7.510** -0.00850 -1.594* 1.616
(2.029) (-1.203) (-1.700) (0.567)
POST x MANDATORY -2.795* -0.00277 0.791** 0.319
(-1.917) (-1.095) (2.504) (0.380)
US_GAAP -1.447 -0.00813*** 0.215 1.950
(-1.419) (-4.652) (0.461) (1.200)
ADR -6.762 0.00219 -2.672 -4.764***
(-1.077) (0.510) (-0.941) (-4.429)
BIG5 -0.789** -0.00194* 0.0265 0.103
(-2.354) (-1.871) (0.268) (0.395)
LN_MVE -4.103*** -0.00682*** 1.290*** 1.954***
(-17.17) (-7.943) (20.85) (8.996)
BM_RATIO -0.990*** -0.00264*** 0.370*** 0.943***
(-4.209) (-3.438) (5.360) (6.852)
LEVERAGE 0.345 0.00191 -0.116 -1.653
(0.210) (0.416) (-0.233) (-1.608)
NI_LOSS 1.797*** 0.00376*** -0.304*** -0.629***
(5.570) (4.183) (-3.591) (-3.182)
ROA -7.163* -0.0345*** -2.045* 2.514
(-1.917) (-2.821) (-1.816) (0.767)
COMP Match Quality Measures Y Y Y Y
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 24,198 19,361 16,766 18,149
R-Squared 0.288 0.209 0.375 0.056
The tests in this table examine heterogeneity in the benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption, in particular whether 
firms with large increases in beneficial disclosure (Factor1) received greater benefits of adoption, and whether 
firms with large increases in unbeneficial disclosure (Factor2) received smaller benefits of adoption. The base 
specification is a difference-in-difference design where POST x MANDATORY (defined as in Table 7) is the 
benefit for firms who mandatorily adopted IFRS.  HBen (LBen) is an indicator variable equal to one if the change 
in FACTOR1 (FACTOR2) in the year of IFRS adoption was in the top quintile for all firms. Thus the interaction of 
POST x MANDATORY with HBen (LBen) is the incremental benefit of mandatory adoption for firms that showed 
high (low) quality changes in their disclosure around adoption. Panel A reports OLS results. Panel B reports the 
results of an instrumental variables regression where 3-digit ICB industry dummies and their interactions with 
POST x MANDATORY are used as instruments. POST, MANDATORY, HBen and LBen are excluded because 
they are perfectly collinear with our firm and year fixed effects.
All continuous, non-logarithmic variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  All control variables are 
lagged to mitigate endogeneity problems. We also control for the quality of the peer matches of the COMP 
measures.
Robust t-statistics clustered by firm reported in Panel A. Bootstrapped t-statistics reported in Panel B.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B. Instrumental Variables Analysis
